Essays On Earnings Guidance by Yang, Ihwa











Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 





















© 2010 Ihwa Yang 
ESSAYS ON EARNINGS GUIDANCE 
Ihwa Yang, Ph.D. 
Cornell University 2010 
 
The first chapter of this dissertation examines the association between 
guidance frequency, guidance properties, and market reactions. The results suggest 
that the characteristics and market responses to guidance issued by occasional and 
frequent guiders differ. Compared to occasional guiders, frequent guiders issue 
guidance in a timelier manner and their guidance issuances are less optimistically 
biased, more accurate, and more precise. Controlling for the amount of news issued, 
the market reaction to guidance issued by frequent guiders is more positive for good 
news and less negative for bad news, consistent with market awareness of the 
differences in guidance properties between frequent and occasional guiders. Overall, 
the results are consistent with frequency being an important classificatory variable. 
The second chapter examines whether investors and analysts recognize differences in 
individual managers’ guidance accuracy and bias, and if they tailor their responses to 
management guidance. The results suggest that investors react more strongly and 
assign more credibility to managers who have greater guidance accuracy, and that 
investors adjust for guidance bias by reacting more positively (less negatively) to good 
(bad) news guidance issued by managers who are more pessimistic. However, the 
results for the changes in analysts’ consensus forecasts suggest that analyst experience 
plays an important role in their responses to management guidance. I find that in their 
forecast revisions, analysts adjust for managers’ guidance accuracy and bias only if the 
analysts themselves have sufficient forecasting experience. 
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ANALYZING GUIDANCE AT THE FIRM LEVEL: 
THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN GUIDANCE FREQUENCY, GUIDANCE 
PROPERTIES, AND MARKET REACTIONS  
Abstract 
This paper argues that frequent guiders are likely to represent a class or type of 
firm that commits to increased levels of disclosure and therefore have different 
incentives and processes that affect the properties of the guidance, its market impact, 
and learning over time. Using earnings guidance data from Thomson First Call, we 
rank firms into quintiles based on guidance frequency and examine guidance 
properties and market participants’ responses across different frequency groups. Our 
results suggest that the characteristics and market responses to guidance issued by 
occasional and frequent guiders differ. Compared to occasional guiders, frequent 
guiders issue guidance in a timelier manner and their guidance issuances are less 
optimistically biased, more accurate, and more precise. Controlling for the amount of 
news issued, we also find that the market reaction to guidance issued by frequent 
guiders is more positive for good news and less negative for bad news, consistent with 
market awareness of the differences in guidance properties between frequent and 
occasional guiders. Frequent guiders also display improvements over time in guidance 
accuracy, bias, and timeliness, that are consistent with a better understanding of the 
guidance process. Overall, our results are consistent with frequency being an 
important classificatory variable.  
 




Prior research has examined several aspects of earnings guidance including 
factors that influence the propensity to issue guidance, properties of the guidance 
issued, analysts’ and market responses to guidance, and reasons why firms stop 
issuing guidance.1,2 Little is known, however, about the extent to which a firm’s 
overall propensity to issue guidance is related to the properties of the guidance issued 
and the market’s reaction to the guidance. In this paper, we argue that guidance 
frequency is an important classificatory variable. Frequent guiders are likely to 
represent a class or type of firms that commit to increased levels of disclosure through 
their guidance (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Brown, Hillegeist and Lo 2004) and 
therefore have different incentives and processes that affect the properties of the 
guidance, its market impact, and learning over time. Classifying based on guidance 
frequency also furthers our understanding of some of the results documented in prior 
studies.  
While prior research is silent on the link between the quantity and quality of 
the respective disclosures, our empirical results suggest that there is a significantly 
positive association between the two constructs. We find that firms that guide more 
frequently provide guidance earlier in the period, with lower error, less optimistic bias, 
and more precision than occasional guiders.3 Similar to firms that commit to increased 
levels of disclosure independent of the content of the news, we also find that frequent 
                                                 
1 We define earnings guidance as all management earnings forecasts issued after the start of a fiscal 
quarter and before the earnings announcement. 
2 See Venkataraman, Koonce, and Hirst (2008) for a recent review of the literature on management 
earnings forecasts. 
3 We define precision as the range-width of guidance and specificity as an ordinal variable that gives the 
highest value to the most specific guidance form. Point, range, open-ended, and qualitative guidance are 
coded as 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. 
3 
guiders issue guidance when news is more positive compared to occasional guiders.4 
Our results are robust to a regression analysis that includes firm fixed effects and 
variables associated with firm maturity. While several firm characteristics such as size, 
litigation risk, analyst following, profitability, and institutional ownership are 
significantly related to guidance frequency, the signs of many of the effects run 
counter to the argument that the stability that comes with firm maturity accounts for 
the differences noted above.  
Also similar to firms that commit to increased levels of disclosure so as to 
reduce their cost of capital (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Brown et al. 2004), we find 
that markets react differently to guidance issued by frequent guiders. Controlling for 
the amount of news issued, we show that the market reaction to guidance issued by 
frequent guiders is more positive for good news and less negative for bad news. This 
is consistent with market awareness of our findings that occasional guiders tend to 
issue more optimistic and less accurate guidance as compared with frequent guiders.  
The discussion so far has focused on what can be gleaned by comparing 
frequent guiders to occasional guiders. Research in economics (Arrow 1962), 
psychology (Einhorn and Hogarth 1978), and management (Huber 1991; Zollo and 
Winter 2002) finds that individuals and organizations learn through experience when 
frequency and immediacy of feedback are high. Earnings guidance provides a setting 
where immediacy of feedback is high (based on market response to actual earnings). 
In addition, the “Learning-by-Doing” (LBD) model assumes that the marginal cost of 
performing a task decreases as the cumulative experience with the task increases. The 
learning that occurs can take on several forms including learning to self-select out of 
                                                 
4 We also find that 48% of the guidance issued by frequent guiders was in periods of bad news as 
compared with 60% for the occasional guiders. This suggests that frequent guiders are willing to guide 
independent of the nature of news, which is consistent with a commitment to disclose. Occasional 
guiders, on the other hand, guide in periods of bad news. 
4 
guidance disclosure (Chen, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 2007; Feng and Koch 2008; 
Houston, Lev, and Tucker 2009), learning the parameters of the underlying process 
that generates the estimates, gaining a better understanding of the flexibility in their 
accounting system to meet announced guidance numbers, and gaining a better 
understanding of the market’s expectation in terms of the properties and timing of 
guidance.5  
While all these forms of learning suggest that the properties of guidance should 
improve over time for frequent guiders, we carry out analyses to examine if firms 
display learning beyond that implied by the first form of learning, self-selection. We 
carry out two kinds of analyses. We first use the traditional Heckman two-stage 
selection model to control for the form of learning that causes firms to stop reporting. 
The results reported in section five suggest that at least part of the results we find on 
frequent guiders is attributable to the type of learning that occurs as a result of a better 
understanding of the guidance process. While we control for factors associated with 
firm maturity in the analysis, to the extent that the controls are imperfect, it is possible 
that firm maturation is a contributor to our results. 
We also conduct a matched sample analysis by comparing guidance issued by 
frequent guiders to guidance issued by occasional guiders over time. Using a matched 
sample approach also controls for learning that can occur in the absence of public 
disclosure of guidance (the occasional guiders act as the benchmark for internal 
                                                 
5 While firms that refrain from issuing public guidance still have internal targets and opportunities to 
improve the quality of their guidance over time, we argue it is not the same as issuing guidance. First, 
they do not receive feedback from market participants’ responses about the costs and benefits of 
guidance, which is our main motivation for examining analysts’ and market reactions to guidance. 
Second, if public issuance of guidance affects the benefits from higher quality guidance, it should cause 
more resources to be invested in the guidance generation and disclosure process. Third, learning about 
the flexibility of the accounting system to meet guidance estimates could be more muted in the absence 
of a publicly issued guidance. To control for learning that occurs even in the absence of public 
disclosure of guidance, we examine properties of guidance of frequent guiders adjusted for properties of 
guidance issued by occasional guiders. 
5 
learning). Consistent with the effect of learning, we continue to find that guidance 
issued by frequent firms becomes more accurate, less optimistically biased, and more 
timely. Interestingly, the results of this analysis suggest that, contrary to the self-
selection hypothesis, the frequent guiders are less accurate compared to the occasional 
guiders in their early guidance attempts. This finding suggests that the frequent 
guiders are not simply those that were successful in their early guidance and points 
more to a commitment or policy to guide.  
In addition to the effect on guidance properties, market response and learning, 
we find that classifying firms based on guidance frequency helps to shed more light on 
some of the empirical evidence documented in prior studies. For example, early work 
in guidance found that firms are more likely to issue good news guidance (e.g. Patell 
1976; Penman 1980; Lev and Penman 1990) while more recent work has documented 
a greater likelihood of guidance in the face of bad news (e.g., Francis, Philbrick, and 
Schipper 1994; Skinner 1994; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Skinner 1997). Our results show 
that frequent guiders are more likely to guide independent of the news while 
occasional guiders are more likely to guide in periods of bad news. Frequent guiders 
are also less likely to report losses, more likely to meet or beat analysts’ consensus 
forecasts, and have higher ROAs, thereby indicating the bad news hypothesis is more 
applicable to occasional guiders. Similarly, while some studies provide evidence that 
guidance issuance reduces bid-ask spreads and analyst dispersion (Coller and Yohn 
1997; Clement, Frankel, and Miller 2003), others suggest that management guidance 
on average, increases investor uncertainty (Baginski, Conrad, and Hassell 1993; 
Rogers, Skinner and Van Buskirk 2009). Our results suggest that analyst dispersion is 
lower, on average, for firms that guide frequently and that investors and analysts 
respond more to their guidance issuances.  
6 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the 
background literature and develops the empirical predictions. Section three describes 
the data and sample selection. Section four defines the variables and provides 
descriptive statistics while section five provides the results of the association tests 
between guidance frequency and guidance properties. Section six examines whether 
firms exhibit learning in the properties of the guidance issued. Section seven discusses 
the additional analyses while section eight summarizes the paper. 
2. Prior Research and Empirical Predictions 
2.1. Guidance Frequency, Guidance Properties and Market Response 
Following Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Brown et al. (2004), we argue that 
firms commit to a higher level of disclosure to benefit from decreases in information 
asymmetry. Using frequency of conference calls as an indicator of an ex ante policy of 
enhanced disclosure, Brown et al. (2004) find that greater call frequency results in 
lower information asymmetry. In the same spirit as Brown et al. (2004), we argue that 
guidance frequency can be rationally used by investors as reflecting an ex-ante policy 
of enhanced disclosure and therefore frequent guiders are similar to firms that commit 
to other types of increased disclosure.6 In our framework, firms have two decisions to 
make regarding guidance. First, they choose the class or type of firm to which they 
belong (frequent or occasional guiders) and then they choose whether to issue 
guidance as well as the properties of the guidance in any given period.7 Both choices 
                                                 
6 Surveys of managers support this argument (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). 
7 Guidance commitment or policy is also likely to be affected by management changes. This could 
result in a situation where a firm that guided only a few times might in fact have had a policy to guide, 
but stopped guiding after management turnover. However, we do not believe this has a major effect on 
the interpretation of our results. First, even with an ex-ante policy to guide, if a firm has done so only a 
few times, it is unlikely to have accumulated enough experience to fully enjoy the benefits of its initial 
policy choice. To the degree these firms have such experience, treating the policy guiders who briefly 
had a policy in place and therefore guided only a few times as occasional guiders decreases our chances 
of finding significant results. Second, by classifying firms based on observed frequency, we are 
7 
are driven by a trade-off between the relative costs and benefits. However, aspiring to 
being a frequent guider in the first stage significantly changes the cost-benefit trade-
off in the second stage by making the guidance issuance process a repeat game for the 
frequent guiders. Thus, we expect occasional guiders to issue guidance based only on 
consideration of current circumstances, while frequent guiders have to be aware that 
this is just one in a series of potential issuances.  
Guidance properties of frequent guiders are therefore likely to be different 
from those of occasional guiders. For example, when issuing guidance frequent 
guiders are likely to be less affected by the nature of news being disclosed. Skinner 
(1994) and Kasznik and Lev (1995) argue that one reason a firm issues guidance is the 
preemptive dissemination of bad news, thereby fending off potential litigation. Under 
this scenario firms are more likely to communicate bad news through guidance 
issuances. But for firms that are regular guiders, not issuing or stopping guidance can 
prove costly (Chen et al. 2007; Houston et al. 2009) and they are less likely to be 
constrained to bad news settings. Thus we predict that the bad news hypothesis is 
more applicable to occasional guiders. 
Prior work examining analysts’ forecasts has found that firms enjoy a premium 
to beating earnings (Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; 
Bhojraj, Hribar, McInnis, and Picconi 2009). Research has also found that analysts’ 
forecasts follow an optimistic-pessimistic pattern over time (Richardson, Teoh, and 
Wysocki 2004; Ke and Yu 2006; and Libby, Hunton, Tan, and Seybert 2008), and that 
bias in short-term management guidance contributes to this pattern (Baik and Jiang 
2006; Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki 2006). These streams of work suggest that a 
                                                                                                                                            
ensuring that these firms have maintained the policy to guide for an extended period independent of 
managerial turnover.  Finally, to further lessen the possibility of management changes determining our 
results, we carry out rolling period analyses and analyses using a shorter period of 8 years and find 
similar results.     
8 
pessimistic bias in short-term management guidance is desirable and advantageous. 
We predict that frequent guiders are more aware of the benefits of being pessimistic 
and their guidance will reflect this awareness. Finally, frequent guiders are also more 
likely to commit greater resources to the process of guidance generation to achieve the 
benefits of reduced information asymmetry and are likely to learn from past guidance 
history. This should be reflected in greater accuracy, tighter ranges, and an ability to 
generate guidance earlier in the period.  
Prior research provides limited evidence on the association between firms’ 
guidance records and market responses. Williams (1996) finds that analysts are more 
responsive to a current period management forecast if the management forecast in the 
prior period is more useful, but only for good news. In contrast, Hutton and Stocken 
(2009) find that investor reactions to both good news and bad news guidance are 
increasing in the length and accuracy of firm’s prior guidance history. Their evidence 
suggests that firms increase their perceived credibility by establishing a record for 
issuing accurate guidance.  
As discussed earlier, while we expect frequent guiders to be more accurate, we 
also expect them to be less optimistic than occasional guiders. This suggests that the 
market response to guidance issued by frequent guiders as compared to those issued 
by occasional guiders, per unit of news, will vary depending on the sign of the news 
(i.e., good news or bad news). The greater accuracy of the frequent guiders should 
result in a larger market response per unit of news for both good and bad 
news. However, if the market adjusts for the greater optimistic bias on the part of the 
occasional guiders, this would result in a larger market response per unit of good 
news, but a smaller reaction per unit of bad news for the frequent guiders compared 
with the occasional guiders. As a consequence, we expect a greater market response 
9 
per unit of good news for frequent guiders, but may see a greater or smaller reaction 
per unit of bad news for frequent guiders, compared with the occasional guiders. 
2.2. Guidance Frequency and Learning 
Research in economics (Arrow 1962), psychology (Einhorn and Hogarth 
1978), and management (Huber 1991; Zollo and Winter 2002) finds that individuals 
and organizations learn through experience when frequency and immediacy of 
feedback are high. In addition, the learning-by-doing (LBD) model argues that the 
effort involved in executing a task is decreasing in the cumulative experience. 
Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) incorporate assumptions of the Learning-by-
Doing model to show that analysts’ forecast accuracy improves with experience.  
Earnings guidance provides an interesting setting to examine organizational 
learning because it is a repetitive setting where feedback from the market is quick. 
Firms that are likely to issue regular guidance have an incentive to expend effort and 
invest resources in the guidance issuance process until the marginal benefit from 
guidance improvement is equal to the marginal cost in each period. These firms are 
also more likely to incorporate and benefit from feedback they receive from markets 
on the guidance issued. The learning that occurs can take on several forms. First, firms 
could learn that they are low quality guiders and choose to change their guidance 
policy. This is a form of self-selection that we try to control for in our analysis. 
Second, firms could learn about the underlying process that generates the estimates. 
This should result in improved extrapolation models within the firm to better predict 
earnings. Third, firms could gain a better understanding of the flexibility in their 
accounting system to meet announced guidance numbers. Lastly, firms could gain a 
better understanding of the market’s expectation in terms of the properties and timing 
of guidance and make adjustments accordingly. While the second and third form of 
10 
learning affect the firm’s ability to generate guidance with certain properties, the last 
form of learning affects the firm’s ability to issue guidance with properties favored by 
the market. The feedback received by firms from markets after providing guidance 
should also improve their understanding of the costs and benefits of providing 
guidance. In terms of the properties of guidance favored by the market, and the 
resultant direction in the evolution of guidance issued, prior work provides an 
indication of market’s preference. Prior work indicates that markets respond more to 
accurate guidance as well as guidance with a tighter range (Hutton and Stocken 2009; 
Libby, Tan, and Hunton 2006). As discussed earlier, research shows that analysts’ 
forecasts follow an optimistic-pessimistic pattern over time (Richardson et al. 2004; 
Ke and Yu 2006; and Libby et al. 2008), and that bias in short-term management 
guidance contributes to this pattern (Baik and Jiang, 2006 and Cotter et al. 2006). 
These streams of work suggest that a less optimistic bias in short-term management 
guidance is desirable and advantageous.8 A timely disclosure allows the managers’ 
private information to be more quickly incorporated into prices and consequently 
reduces information asymmetries (King, Pownall, and Waymire 1990). Therefore, we 
suggest that timelier guidance (without sacrificing guidance accuracy) would be 
preferred. We argue that guidance frequency and the resulting experience enhances 
firms’ ability to understand and respond to the market’s preference and therefore 
predict that firms with experience will become more accurate, have tighter range, be 
less optimistically biased and issue guidance earlier. 
                                                 
8 In addition to the market’s preference, managers have incentives to issue positive disclosures that 
increase their stock price (Verrecchia 1983). However, they also face an asymmetric loss function for 
issuing overly optimistic forecasts (Skinner 1994). Therefore, we argue that firms will learn to weight 
the benefits of issuing more good news with the costs of issuing an unattainable forecast resulting in 
less optimistically biased guidance as guidance experience increases. 
11 
3. Sample Selection 
We begin with a sample of quarterly earnings forecasts in the First Call 
Company Issued Guidelines (CIG) file. The CIG file includes both quarterly and 
annual forecasts but we limit our sample to quarterly EPS guidance because feedback 
is more immediate in this setting. We identify each estimate as point, range, open-
ended, or qualitative following the guidelines in Anilowski, Feng, and Skinner (2007). 
We include only forecasts issued during the period from 1995 to 2005 and further 
restrict our observations to the first guidance issued if a firm guides more than once 
for a given quarter.9 After deleting all guidance revisions, we merge the CIG file with 
Compustat and only retain firms with available data on Compustat and firms that are 
in existence the entire period from the end of fiscal years 1995 to 2005. This 
requirement eliminates the possibility that our findings are attributable to a survival 
bias where poor performers are subsequently dropped out of our sample in later 
periods and therefore appear as occasional guiders.10 We then measure firms’ 
guidance frequency by calculating the number of quarters (Frequency) in which a firm 
has issued quarterly guidance during our sample period. This results in a sample of 
1,821 firms.  
  
                                                 
9 We do not consider revisions in our sample as we are interested in the number of “quarters” rather 
than the number of “times” a firm guides during 1995-2005. Our results are also similar when we use 
the last guidance issued each quarter. 
10 We examine the robustness of our results to alternative sample selection specifications. The results 
using these alternative specifications are similar to those described in the main results. These alternative 
specifications are discussed in more detail in the additional analyses section. 
12 
 
Table 1.1. Distribution of Management Guidance 1995-2005 
1995  1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  Total Row%
1  269  257  217  305 202 194 163 69 55 54  36  1821 12.25
2  52  137  164  266 204 204 219 91 67 58  42  1504 10.12
3  6  52  101  179 209 221 228 130 75 64  30  1295 8.71
4  22  38  116 165 210 264 130 97 77  39  1158 7.79
5  4  25  64 120 154 266 175 89 84  46  1027 6.91
6  1  12  35 72 128 220 205 99 92  49  913 6.14
7  5  23 42 99 178 209 126 88  42  812 5.46
8  2  13 22 64 154 196 138 96  59  744 5.01
9  1  8 13 48 113 180 137 108  68  676 4.55
10  4 10 28 78 160 140 111  78  609 4.10
11  2 8 15 63 122 145 115  85  555 3.73
12  1 2 14 45 97 143 109  84  495 3.33
13  1 10 30 78 142 113  78  452 3.04
14  1 7 19 53 118 138  80  416 2.80
15  1 3 13 42 94 135  82  370 2.49
16  2 8 35 72 128  83  328 2.21
17  1 6 26 52 121  94  300 2.02
18  1 2 15 38 103  111  270 1.82
19  2 9 33 79  111  234 1.57
20  2 5 25 63  107  202 1.36
21  1 4 19 46  98  168 1.13
22  1 1 12 31  89  134 0.90
23  2 4 32  66  104 0.70
24  2 4 19  50  75 0.50
25  1 4 14  38  57 0.38
26  2 10  28  40 0.27
27  2 4  25  31 0.21
28  2 4  16  22 0.15
29  1 4  11  16 0.11
30  2  8  10 0.07
31  2  4  6 0.04
32  2  3  5 0.03
33  1  3  4 0.03
34  2  2 0.01
35  2  2 0.01
36  2  2 0.01
37  1  1 0.01
Total  327  473  565  1016 1072 1403 2075 2037 1935 2107  1850  14860
Column%  2.20  3.18  3.80  6.84 7.21 9.44 13.96 13.71 13.02 14.18  12.45  0.01
The row (column) indicates the sequence (year) of guidance issuance. The minimum (maximum) 
number of guidance issued for our sample firms during 1995-2005 is 1 (37). 
  
13 
The resulting sample is merged with returns data from CRSP, analyst 
information from IBES, institutional ownership data from Thomson, and executive 
compensation data from Execucomp. Of the 1,821 firms in our sample, 1,584 firms 
have analyst and institutional ownership data while 855 have Execucomp data. Given 
that Execucomp significantly constrains our sample, we use the subsample of firms 
that are on IBES and Thomson for most of our analyses to maximize the power of our 
tests.11 However, in keeping with findings of Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) we 
examine a specification that includes executive compensation in the analysis of 
guidance frequency. We also control for firm fixed effects when possible to address 
concerns about correlated omitted variables.  
Table 1.1 provides the number of management forecasts in our sample by 
sequence and year. The minimum (maximum) guidance frequency is 1 (37). 269 firms 
issued their first forecast in 1995 compared with 36 firms in 2005. The last row 
provides the total number of forecasts issued per year. Consistent with Anilowski et al. 
(2007), the number of forecasts increases steadily from 1995 to 1997 but experiences a 
jump in 1998.12 The number of forecasts issued again increases significantly in 2001 
which may be due to the effect of Regulation FD.  
                                                 
11 Since we lose a small number of firms due to lack of analyst data, we also examine our results using 
the entire sample of firms without requiring analyst information. The results are very similar to those 
using the primary sample. 
12 Anilowski et al. (2007) find an increase in the number of forecasts in the database starting in 1998.  
We choose to use the longer sample period because that increases the power of our primary variable of 
interest (identifying frequent guiders), especially in the learning analysis in section 5. We believe that 
ignoring information relating to known guidance quarters prior to 1998 and assuming that a firm 
commences learning in 1998 is an inferior sample selection choice. However, to examine the robustness 
of our results, we also carry out an analysis using a sample that commences in 1998. The results are 
very similar to those discussed in the main section of the paper. We discuss this in more detail in the 
additional analyses section. 
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4. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1. Measures of Guidance Properties  
We examine the association between guidance frequency and several guidance 
properties including error, bias, specificity, range and horizon. Error is the absolute 
difference between guidance and actual earnings, scaled by beginning-of-quarter 
price.13 Bias is guidance minus actual earnings, scaled by beginning-of-quarter price. 
Therefore, a positive value of Bias suggests that managers were optimistic in their 
forecasts. The Error and Bias variables are calculated using actual earnings reported in 
the First Call Actuals file to ensure consistency between management guidance and 
EPS realizations. Specificity is an ordinal variable for guidance specificity where 
point, range, open-ended, and qualitative guidance are coded as 4, 3, 2, and 1, 
respectively. Range is the width of range guidance issuances, scaled by beginning-of-
quarter price.14 Horizon is the number of days between guidance issuance and the 
fiscal period end. This can take on positive or negative values depending on whether 
the guidance was issued prior to or subsequent to the fiscal year end. 
4.2. Measures of Market Response  
To examine market response to guidance we examine two measures. 
MktReaction is the three-day cumulative adjusted returns centered on guidance 
issuance date. ChgConsensus is the difference in analysts’ mean consensus forecasts 
before and after guidance issuance, scaled by beginning price. 
                                                 
13 The value of the guidance is either the point or open-ended estimate given by the manager or the mid-
point of the range estimate. We use the mid-point for range estimates because prior research suggests 
that investors use the mid-point when forming their expectations of earnings (Baginski et al. 1993).  
14 We use the logged transformation of Error and Range when they are the dependent variable in any of 
our multivariate analyses since the values of Error and Range are always non-negative. Untabulated 
tests indicate that results using the untransformed values are similar.  
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4.3. Explanatory and Control Variables  
We measure firms’ guidance frequency by calculating the number of quarters 
(Frequency) in which a firm has issued quarterly guidance during our sample period. 
In our analysis, we use the frequency of guidance issued as the quintile classification 
variable. Our main independent variable, MGQuintile, is the quintile rank of 
Frequency over our sample period. We use several control variables drawn from prior 
research in our analysis. We include the market value of firm equity (Size) because 
prior studies find a positive association between firm size and guidance occurrence 
(Kasznik and Lev 1995; Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005). We proxy for 
performance using return on assets (ROA) as Miller (2002) finds that disclosure 
frequency declines with weaker earnings performance. TotalNews is the difference 
between actual earnings and analysts’ expectation prior to the guidance. We use this 
measure because it captures both the news at the earnings guidance issuance and the 
earnings announcement date (Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther 2000). Because 
managers of loss firms have greater difficulty estimating earnings (Ajinkya et al. 
2005), we also control for whether a firm reported a loss in a specific quarter (Loss). 
Litigation risk (LitRisk) is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is in the biotech, 
retailing, electronics, or computer industry. Prior research provides mixed evidence on 
the association between litigation risk and guidance. Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that 
firms in high litigation risk industries issue guidance less frequently while Skinner 
(1994) and Wang (2007) find that these firms are more proactive in issuing voluntary 
disclosures. Following Bamber and Cheon (1998), we include market to book (M/B) 
as a proxy for proprietary costs because of its negative association with guidance. 
However, it can also be considered as a proxy for information asymmetry (Verrecchia 
1990), which would then predict a positive association between M/B and Frequency. 
Waymire (1985) finds that firms with volatile earnings issue forecasts less frequently. 
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Earnings volatility (EarnVol) is defined as the volatility of seasonally adjusted 
earnings for the twelve quarters before the current fiscal quarter, divided by median 
assets over the twelve quarters. We also include a firm’s equity beta (Beta) as a proxy 
for market risk (Bushee and Noe 2000). Ajinkya et al. (2005) examine the effect of 
institutional ownership on management guidance and find that firms with larger 
institutional ownership issue guidance more frequently. Therefore, we also control for 
institutional ownership (Inst). Similarly, we include the number of analysts following 
(Num) and dispersion in analysts’ consensus forecasts (Disp) because we expect firms 
committed to increased disclosure to have higher analyst following and lower analyst 
dispersion (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Lang and Lundholm 1996). Feng and Koch (2008) 
find that firms that disappoint analyst expectations in the past are more likely to stop 
issuing future guidance. Therefore, we also include an indicator variable equal to one 
if the firm meets or beats analysts’ consensus forecasts in that quarter (MBAnalyst). 
The number of business segments (Segments) as a proxy for firm complexity is 
relevant because firms with multiple product lines and subsidiaries are more likely to 
benefit from increased disclosures that help investors analyze the firm. We also 
control for a firm’s financial reporting conservatism and performance variability 
because Hui, Matsunaga, and Morse (2009) find that firms with more conservative 
financial statements and variability in their performance issue guidance less frequently 
in subsequent periods. Our measure of conservatism (Cons) is total accruals scaled by 
total assets averaged over 1990 to 1994 (Givoly and Hayn 2000). Following Hui et al. 
(2009), we also use the standard deviation of annual stock returns (RetVol) prior to the 
guidance period (1990-1994) as a proxy for performance uncertainty. However, firms 
with high variability in their performance are also likely to disclose more frequently to 
assist investors’ valuations. Lastly, Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) find that stock 
price-based incentives elicit managers to disclose more frequently. Therefore, we also 
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examine the average ratio of the CEO’s equity compensation to total compensation 
(Ecomp) and the logged value of the CEO’s shareholdings (Wealth).  
4.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1.2 provides univariate descriptive statistics on the firm 
characteristics for the firms in the various quintiles. Firms in MGQuintile1 issued 
guidance only once during our sample period while the average guidance frequency is 
20.44 for firms in MGQuintile5. We find that several firm characteristics are 
significantly related to guidance frequency. Firms that issued guidance more 
frequently are significantly larger. The median firm in MGQuintile5 is approximately 
10 times larger than the median firm in MGQuintile1. The frequent guiders are also 
less likely to report losses, and are more likely to be from high litigation risk 
industries. Frequent guiders also have higher ROAs, lower earnings volatility, lower 
return volatility, higher institutional ownership, more analysts following, and lower 
analyst dispersion. While occasional guiders are likely to guide in periods of bad 
news, frequent guiders are not limited by the news in providing guidance. The average 
TotalNews for MGQuintile5 is not significantly different from zero. However, the 
average percentage of quarters where TotalNews is greater or equal to zero is 
significantly higher for firms in MGQuintile5. Guidance frequency also increases in 
both the proportion of CEO compensation tied to the stock price and the value of the 
CEO’s stockholdings. While we would expect frequent guiders to be more mature and 
stable firms, their price to earnings ratios suggest otherwise. The difference in means 
of firms in MGQuintile1 and MGQuintile5 are significant at the five percent level 
using a t-test for all but three of the variables. 
We examine the association between guidance frequency and firm 
characteristics using a multivariate Poisson regression. We use the Poisson regression 
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method rather than the OLS because the dependent variable is count data. The model 
is as follows (firm subscripts and the intercept term have been suppressed):  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17
/
                     
                     
Frequency Size Loss ROA LitRisk M B EarnVol Beta Inst
TotalNews Num MBAnalyst Disp Cons RetVol
Segments Ecomp Wealth
β β β β β β β β
β β β β β β
β β β
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + +                                                         (1)ε+  
Frequency is the number of initial management forecasts issued between 1995 and 
2005. The explanatory variables are as described earlier. Given that Frequency is a 
firm level variable, the explanatory variables used in the regression are firm averages 
from 1995 to 2005.15 
Panel B of Table 1.2 provides results of this analysis. We first report the results 
corresponding to the full sample of 1,821 firms. Consistent with the univariate 
statistics, guidance frequency is positively associated with firm size, performance (as 
proxied by ROA and Loss), litigation risk, information asymmetry (as proxied by 
M/B), and market risk (as proxied by Beta). We also find that guidance frequency is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of having losses. We next include controls 
for analyst following and institutional ownership and find that guidance frequency 
continues to be significantly associated with Loss, LitRisk, and Beta. The coefficients 
on the analyst and institutional ownership-related variables also suggest that firms 
committed to issuing guidance have a higher number of analysts following (Num), 
larger institutional ownership (Inst), lower analyst dispersion (Disp), and are more 
likely to meet or beat analysts’ consensus (MBAnalyst). The positive coefficient on 
TotalNews confirms the univariate results that guidance frequency is positively 
associated with news. The univariate and multivariate results on TotalNews, ROA and 
Loss help reconcile mixed results in prior research on whether firms guide in periods 
of bad or good performance. The results suggest that firms that display a commitment 
                                                 
15 RetVol and Cons are firm averages from 1990 to 1994. 
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to guide are less constrained by the nature of news in providing guidance and are 
therefore likely to guide in periods of good and bad news. Earlier findings indicating 
increased guidance during periods of bad news are therefore more applicable to 
occasional guiders. We also control for conservatism and return volatility in this 
specification and find that firms with more conservative financial statements issue 
guidance less frequently consistent with Hui et al. (2009). Following Nagar et al. 
(2003), the last column presents results controlling for the number of business 
segments (Segments) and management stock-based incentives (Ecomp and Wealth). 
The positive and significant coefficients on Segments and Wealth suggest that more 
complex firms and firms whose CEOs have more wealth tied to the firm’s stocks also 
issue guidance more frequently. Note that our sample size is reduced by half when we 
include controls for management stock-based incentives because a majority of firms in 
the bottom guidance frequency quintiles do not have complete CEO compensation 
data on ExecuComp. Therefore, we only include controls for analyst following and 
institutional ownership to maximize the number of sample firms in our subsequent 
tests. 
Consistent with prior research, the findings from this analysis suggest that 
firms which commit to increased disclosure are different from firms that issue 
guidance occasionally across several dimensions. Moreover, the findings from this 
analysis provide evidence against a pure maturation based explanation for our results. 
Although frequent guiders are larger firms, they are also more likely to be in litigation 
prone industries (which tend to have high growth). This higher growth setting is 
consistent with the higher market to book ratios and the higher price to earnings 




Table 1.2. Guidance Frequency and Firm Characteristics 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics 
   MGQuintile1  MGQuintile2  MGQuintile3  MGQuintile4  MGQuintile5 
   M  Median  N  M Median N M Median N  M Median N M Median N
Frequency  1.00  1.00  317  2.40  2.00  346  5.26  5.00  414  10.63  10.00  374  20.44*** 20.00  370 
Size  1892  183  317  3819  336  346  3720  630  414  4171  750  374  8876*** 1819  370 
Loss  0.28  0.20  317  0.22  0.15  346  0.20  0.14  414  0.19  0.14  374  0.11***  0.07  370 
TotalNews  ‐0.04  ‐0.01  168  ‐0.06  ‐0.03  242  ‐0.04  ‐0.02  314  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  315  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  335 
PosTotalNews
%  0.40  0.00  168  0.31  0.00  242  0.37  0.33  314  0.45  0.50  315  0.52***  0.50  335 
ROA  0.00  0.01  317  0.01  0.01  346  0.01  0.01  414  0.01  0.01  374  0.02***  0.02  370 
LitRisk  0.04  0.00  317  0.04  0.00  346  0.04  0.00  414  0.08  0.00  374  0.17***  0.00  370 
M/B  2.98  1.97  317  4.11  1.98  346  2.71  2.26  414  3.16  2.32  374  5.06  2.90  370 
P/E  8.55  12.63  317  14.11  13.99  346  17.55  16.46  414  17.03  16.55  374  20.90*** 20.04  370 
EarnVol  0.07 0.02 317 0.04 0.01 346 0.04 0.01 414 0.03 0.01 374 0.02* 0.01 371 
Beta  0.86  0.68  317  0.91  0.77  346  1.06  0.88  414  1.10  0.94  374  1.04***  0.92  370 
Inst  0.36  0.33  294  0.44  0.44  326  0.53  0.55  389  0.60  0.63  360  0.65***  0.68  359 
Num  3.51  2.08  272  4.67  3.09  308  6.05  4.02  379  6.76  5.33  356  9.80***  8.09  353 
MBAnalyst  0.54  0.57  272  0.57  0.57  308  0.60  0.62  379  0.65  0.68  356  0.73***  0.74  353 
Disp  0.03  0.02  225  0.03  0.02  284  0.03  0.02  369  0.03  0.02  354  0.01***  0.01  352 
Segments  1.81  1.65  269  1.89  1.84  309  2.02  1.86  398  2.08  1.96  368  2.08***  1.93  368 
Cons  0.02  0.02  256  0.01  0.01  292  0.01  0.01  368  0.00  0.01  347  0.01**  0.01  350 
RetVol  0.44  0.35  235  0.43  0.37  252  0.40  0.33  303  0.40  0.34  265  0.37***  0.33  286 
Ecomp  0.42  0.43  123  0.44  0.46  163  0.50  0.52  267  0.50  0.52  288  0.53***  0.55  335 
Wealth  31.31  8.55  124  67.47  7.67  162  52.76  9.52  266  58.76  9.70  285  226.38** 11.30  335 
M = mean. The sample consists of 1,821 firms between 1995 and 2005. Frequency is the number of quarterly earnings guidance issuance by a firm (excluding 
revisions) during sample period. MGQuintile is the quintile rank of guidance frequency. Descriptive statistics are reported at the firm level using firm 
averages over the 11-year sample period. See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p< .10, .05, or .01, 
respectively, using a two-tailed t-test of difference in means of MGQuintile 1 and MGQUintile5.  
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Table 1.2 (Continued) 
Panel B Poisson Regression 
   Dependent Variable: Frequency
Size  2.967*** 0.856 ‐0.501
(0.611) (1.124) (1.188)
Loss  ‐1.132*** ‐0.588*** ‐0.629**
(0.155) (0.214) (0.247)
ROA  6.436*** 1.949 ‐2.825
(1.452) (1.799) (2.053)
LitRisk  0.521*** 0.273*** 0.373***
(0.057) (0.063) (0.070)
M/B  0.002*** ‐0.001 ‐0.002
(0.000) (0.003) (0.004)
EarnVol  ‐0.720 ‐0.043 1.567
(0.656) (1.229) (1.473)










This table presents poisson regression tests of the association between firm characteristics and guidance frequency. The dependent variable is the frequency 
of guidance issuances over the 11-year period 1995-2005. See Appendix for variable definitions. Wealth and Size are divided by 106 for expositional 
purposes. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the 2-digit SIC level. Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p< .10, .05, 





















Pseudo R‐squared  0.110 0.180 0.126








Table 1.3. Descriptive Statistics of Guidance Properties 
   MGQuintile1  MGQuintile2  MGQuintile3  MGQuintile4  MGQuintile5 
   M  Median  N  M  Median  N  M  Median  N  M  Median  N  M  Median  N 
Error  0.012  0.004  234 0.010  0.005  316 0.008  0.005  408  0.007  0.005  373 0.005****  0.003  370
Bias  0.012  0.001  234 0.007  0.002  316 0.006  0.002  408  0.003  0.002  373 0.002***  0.002  370
Specificity  2.748  3.000  317 2.763  3.000  346 2.836  3.000  414  2.930  3.000  374 3.043***  3.048  370
Range  0.003  0.002  83  0.003  0.002  220 0.003  0.002  330  0.002  0.002  354 0.002***  0.001  366
Horizon  12.722  1.000  317 23.794  11.667  346 31.485  22.060  414  50.622  47.229  374 60.019***  56.633  370
News  ‐0.003  0.000  153 0.000  ‐0.001  249 0.000  ‐0.001  345  ‐0.001  0.000  348 0.002***  0.000  348
MktReaction  ‐0.031  ‐0.016  297 ‐0.035  ‐0.027  343 ‐0.036  ‐0.026  413  ‐0.021  ‐0.015  374 ‐0.008***  ‐0.006  370
ChgConsensus  ‐0.003  0.000  140 ‐0.005  ‐0.001  249 ‐0.004  ‐0.002  339  ‐0.002  ‐0.001  347 ‐0.001***  ‐0.001  347
M = mean. The sample consists of 1,821 firms between 1995 and 2005. Frequency is the number of quarterly earnings guidance issuance by a firm (excluding 
revisions) during sample period. MGQuintile is the quintile rank of guidance frequency. Descriptive statistics are reported at the firm level using firm 
averages over the 11-year sample period. See Appendix for variable definitions. Variables marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p< .10, .05, or .01, 
respectively, using a two-tailed t-test of difference in means of MGQuintile 1 and MGQUintile5. 
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5. Guidance Frequency, Guidance Properties, and Market Response 
Section four provides strong evidence that frequent guiders are different from 
occasional guiders on many dimensions. In this section, we examine the relation 
between guidance frequency and the properties of the guidance issued and analysts’ 
and market response to them. As with the frequency regression above, the analyses in 
this section are conducted at the firm level using averaged values (and median values) 
from quarterly observations over the sample period (for both the dependent and 
independent variables). This is to ensure that each firm appears only once in the 
analysis and that frequent guiders do not benefit from a larger number of observations 
that would result from a guidance level analysis. We also carry out analyses at the 
firm-quarter level which allows us to use a rolling period specification. This second 
specification, discussed in the additional analysis section, avoids a peek-ahead bias by 
using the past frequency on a rolling basis.  
Table 1.3 provides univariate statistics on the properties of guidance issued by 
firms in the quintiles.16 The frequent guiders (MGQuintile5) display less optimism in 
their guidance with an average optimistic bias of 0.2% of price, approximately one-
sixth the level for firms in MgQuintile1. Frequent guiders are also more accurate than 
the occasional guiders even though they provide their first guidance earlier. Error for 
firms in MGQuintile5 is 0.5% of price as compared to 1.2% of price for firms in 
MgQuintile1. The statistics for Horizon, defined as the number of days between 
guidance issuance and the end of the fiscal period show that frequent guiders on 
average provide their first guidance 60 days prior to the end of the fiscal period as 
compared 12 days prior to the end of the fiscal period for the occasional guiders. 
Frequent guiders appear more likely to understand the earnings generation and 
                                                 
16 To ensure that our results are not driven by extreme outliers in the CIG dataset, we winsorize Error, 
Bias, and Range at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
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disclosure process and therefore are willing to issue guidance earlier. In addition to 
issuing more specific guidance, the frequent guiders also issue much narrower range 
guidance. Average Range-width for the guidance issued by firms in MGQuintile5 is 
0.2% of price as compared with 0.3% of price for firms in MGQuintile1.  
Table 1.3 also provides univariate statistics on the market response variables 
across quintiles. The market response to guidance issued by occasional guiders is 
significantly more negative. The average market response in the three day trading 
window around the guidance issuance date for firms in the first quintile is -3.1%. This 
is compared with a return of -0.8% for firms in the fifth quintile. This is consistent 
with the news conveyed by occasional guiders being much worse than news conveyed 
by frequent guiders. The difference in market response is also evident in the change in 
analysts’ forecasts. ChgConsensus is measured by finding the two statistical periods 
on IBES that are closest around the guidance issuance date and taking the difference 
between the mean consensus forecasts measured in the two periods. We find that, 
there is a significantly larger negative revision in response to guidance by occasional 
guiders.  
We examine the effect of guidance frequency on guidance properties and 
market participants’ responses to guidance utilizing in a multivariate setting using two 
approaches. First, we analyze an OLS specification as follows (firm subscripts and 
intercept terms have been suppressed):  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7( )    (2)Error MGQuintile Log Size Num Loss Horizon LitRisk Instβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7( )      (3)Bias MGQuintile Log Size Num Loss Horizon LitRisk Instβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7( )   (4)Range MGQuintile Log Size Num Loss Horizon LitRisk Instβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +  
1 2 3 4 5 6( )                     (5)Horizon MGQuintile Log Size Num Loss LitRisk Instβ β β β β β ε= + + + + + +  
1 2 3 4 5 6
7
( )
                             (6)
MktReaction MGQuintile Log Size Num Loss Horizon LitRisk
Inst
β β β β β β
β ε
= + + + + +
+ +  
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1 2 3 4 5 6
7
( )
                             (7)
ChgConsensus MGQuintile Log Size Num Loss Horizon LitRisk
Inst
β β β β β β
β ε
= + + + + +
+ +  
One potential issue with the above analysis is that any documented association 
between MgQuintile and the dependent variables could be driven by an association 
between the dependent variables and some of the underlying firm characteristics that 
have been documented in Table 1.2 to be associated with guidance frequency. If that is 
the case then MgQuintile would not have explanatory ability of its own once the 
underlying firm characteristics are controlled for. To mitigate this possibility our 
second analysis involves carrying out a two-stage analysis wherein the first stage 
involves a regression of guidance frequency on several firm characteristics (see 
equation 1). The error term from this regression represents the variation in frequency 
that is unexplained by the firm characteristics. We use this error term in the second 
stage regressions (equations 2 to 7), in place of MGQuintile to isolate the incremental 
effect of frequency on guidance properties. 
In the single stage OLS as well as in the second stage of the two stage analysis 
we control for Size, Num, and Inst because we expect larger firms and firms with more 
analysts following and higher levels of institutional ownership to issue guidance of 
higher quality (Ajinkya et al. 2005). We also include Loss and LitRisk because firms 
experiencing losses or firms in high litigation risk industries are likely to have greater 
difficulty predicting earnings. Lastly, we also control for Horizon because managers 
will have better information about predicted earnings the closer it is to the fiscal 
period end.  
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Table 1.4. Guidance Frequency and Guidance Properties (Means) 
   Error  Bias Range
OLS  2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS  2SLS
MGQuintile  ‐0.002***  ‐0.002*** ‐0.003*** ‐0.002*** ‐0.001*  ‐0.000
   (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000)
Log(Size)  ‐0.000  ‐0.000 ‐0.000 ‐0.000 ‐0.001***  ‐0.001***
(0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000)
Num  ‐0.252  ‐0.343 ‐0.279 ‐0.393 0.014  ‐0.009
(0.187)  (0.209) (0.295) (0.339) (0.020)  (0.016)
Loss  0.014**  0.011* 0.010 0.006 0.004***  0.004***
(0.006)  (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001)  (0.001)
Horizon  0.011**  0.010** 0.007 0.008 0.001*  0.001
(0.005)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)  (0.001)
LitRisk  0.000  ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.002 ‐0.000  ‐0.000
(0.001)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000)
Inst  0.009  0.007 0.019 0.015 ‐0.000  ‐0.000
(0.009)  (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.000)  (0.000)
R‐squared  0.021  0.018 0.010 0.009 0.162  0.159
Firms  1575  1504 1575 1504 1270  1241
   Horizon MktReaction ChgConsensus
   OLS  2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS  2SLS
MGQuintile  0.029***  0.029*** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.001**  0.001**
   (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000)
Log(Size)  0.005  0.004 0.002 0.003* 0.000  0.000
(0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000)
Num  0.264  2.176** 0.113 0.032 0.073  0.095*
(1.121)  (1.065) (0.515) (0.509) (0.052)  (0.053)
Loss  0.023  0.031 ‐0.028** ‐0.027* ‐0.006***  ‐0.006***
(0.021)  (0.023) (0.013) (0.014) (0.002)  (0.002)
Horizon  0.047*** 0.044*** 0.004**  0.004***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.001)  (0.001)
LitRisk  ‐0.000  0.015 0.009 0.012* ‐0.000  ‐0.000
(0.009)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000)  (0.000)
Inst  0.017  0.077*** ‐0.007 0.005 0.000  0.001
(0.018)  (0.019) (0.010) (0.009) (0.001)  (0.001)
R‐squared  0.121  0.113 0.030 0.041 0.080  0.078
Firms  1667  1584 1651 1569 1421  1398
This table presents OLS and 2SLS tests of the association between guidance frequency and guidance 
properties. The IV specification uses the error term from regressing MGQuintile on Loss, LitRisk, Beta, 
Inst, Num, MBAnalyst, and Disp in the first-stage as an instrumental variable for MGQuintile in the 
second-stage regressions. The results in the table reflect the second-stage regressions. See Appendix for 
variable definitions. Size, Num, and Horizon are divided by 106, 103, and 365, respectively, for 
expositional purposes. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the 2-digit SIC level. 
Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p< .10, .05, or .01, respectively, using a two-
tailed test.   
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Table 1.4 provides results of the single stage and two-stage regressions 
explaining guidance properties. The analysis is done using firm level average values.17 
The univariate associations documented earlier continue to hold in the multivariate 
setting. For both specifications, the coefficients on MGQuintile are consistent with a 
positive association between guidance frequency and guidance quality. MGQuintile is 
negatively associated with Error ( 1β = -0.002 and -0.002, p < 0.01), Bias ( 1β = -0.003 
and -0.002, p < 0.01), and Range ( 1β = -0.001, p < 0.1), and positively associated with 
Horizon ( 1β = 0.029, p < 0.01). Tests of the association between guidance frequency 
and market responses also suggest that investors respond more strongly to guidance 
issued by frequent guiders ( 1β = 0.004 and 0.005, p < 0.05). Analysts also respond 
more to guidance from frequent guiders ( 1β = 0.001 and 0.001, p < 0.05). 
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with prior studies. 
In particular, we find that firms reporting losses issue more inaccurate and less precise 
guidance. Consistent with managers having less information in the beginning of the 
period, guidance issued at longer horizons have more error and range-width.18  
Overall, we present evidence that frequent guiders provide guidance of higher 
quality. While prior research is silent on the link between the quantity and quality of 
management guidance, these results suggest that there is a strong association between 
these two constructs.  
                                                 
17 Analysis is also carried out using firm level median values with similar results. This is discussed 
briefly in the additional analysis section. 
18 We also carried out our analysis using a dichotomous variable OPT, where OPT is coded as equal to 
one if the management estimate is optimistically biased. The logit results are similar to the Bias 
findings. 
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6. Learning over Time within Firms 
The analysis thus far examines differences between frequent and occasional 
guiders. As discussed earlier prior research suggests that there is reason to believe that 
earnings guidance is an interesting setting to examine organizational learning. To 
examine if firms exhibit the learning beyond that implied by self-selection, we utilize 
the traditional Heckman two-stage procedure as well as a matched sample procedure. 
6.1. Heckman Two-Stage Estimation 
The Heckman two-stage procedure is applied by estimating the following 
models (firm and time subscripts have been suppressed): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8Pr( )
                                                                                                             (8)
Occur Size Num Loss Inst ROA MB EarnVol LagOccur
FirmFixedEffects
β β β β β β β β
ε
= + + + + + + +
+ +    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9                                                                       (2 )
Error Sequence Size Num Loss Inst LagError Horizon
SOX InvMills FirmFixedEffects a
β β β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + + +
+ + + +  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9                                                                       (3 )
Bias Sequence Size Num Loss Inst LagBias Horizon
SOX InvMills FirmFixedEffects a
β β β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + + +
+ + + +  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9                                                                       (4 )
Range Sequence Size Num Loss Inst LagRange Horizon
SOX InvMills FirmFixedEffects a
β β β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + + +
+ + + +  
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 9                                                                       (5 )
Horizon Sequence Size Num Loss Inst LagHorizon
SOX InvMills FirmFixedEffects a
β β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + + +  
Model (8) is a probit model that estimates the likelihood of guidance 
occurrence. The dependent variable Occur is equal to one if the firm issued guidance 
in that period. The independent variables are Size, Num, Loss, Inst, ROA, MB, 
EarnVol, Cons, RetVol and an indicator variable controlling for guidance occurrence 
in the prior quarter (LagOccur). The variables are as of the beginning of the quarter. 
Estimated parameters from model (8) are then used to calculate the inverse mills ratio 
(InvMills), which is included as an independent variable in the second stage OLS 
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regressions. Models (2a) to (5a) examine whether guidance error, bias, range, and 
horizon improve over time, conditional on likelihood of guidance issuance. Sequence 
is the sequential order of guidance issuances for each firm ranging from 1 to 37. If 
firms learn to improve their guidance quality with repetition, then we expect the error, 
optimistic bias, and range-width in guidance to decrease and the timeliness of 
guidance to increase as Sequence increases.19 We also control for the lag term 
(LagError, LagBias, LagRange, and LagHorizon) in the second stage regressions 
because we expect prior guidance outcomes to be highly associated with current 
period guidance decisions. Firm fixed effects are also included to control for 
correlated omitted variables. We also control for changes in the information 
environment resulting from new regulation by including an indicator variable (SOX) 
post-SOX period which takes on a value 1 for periods after 2002. This variable 
controls for the requirement to disclose internal control weaknesses in Sections 302 
and 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which may incentivize firms to produce more 
accurate interim financial statements after 2002. These financial statements which 
management uses as inputs when forming guidance will then affect the properties of 
the guidance issued (Feng, Li, and McVay 2009).  
Table 1.5 presents results of the Heckman two-stage estimation. As expected, 
Sequence is negatively associated with Error ( 1β = -0.218, p < 0.01) and Bias ( 1β = -
0.002, p < 0.01) and positively associated with Horizon ( 1β = 0.052, p < 0.01). 
However, the coefficient is positive though non-significant for Range. This suggests 
that firms become more accurate, timelier, and less optimistically biased in their 
guidance issuances over time. The results for the control variables are generally 
                                                 
19 The average guidance bias is positive (optimistic) across all MGQuintiles in our sample which is 
likely due to our choice of using the first guidance issued per quarter. However, the fact that frequent 
guiders issue less optimistically biased guidance than occasional guiders is consistent with frequent 
guiders learning to avoid issuing extreme downward revisions to their forecasts. 
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consistent with our expectations except for Inst.20 Overall, the results suggest that 
firms’ guidance properties improve with experience, even after controlling for self-
selection. 
6.2. Matched Sample Analysis 
We also use a matched pair design as an alternative test for the effects of 
learning. By using a sample of guidance issued by occasional guiders as a control 
group, we are better able to attribute the differences observed to the effects of learning 
by the frequent guiders. The properties of the occasional guiders at any point in time 
reflect the general overall information environment and therefore act as our base case. 
For each year in our sample period, we calculate DiffError, DiffBias, DiffRange, and 
DiffHorizon by subtracting the mean guidance error, bias, range, and horizon for 
occasional guiders (MGQuintile5=0) from the mean guidance error, bias, range, and 
horizon for frequent guiders (MGQuintile5=1), respectively. Under the null hypothesis 
of no learning, the differences between the two groups should not change over time. 
However, if frequent guiders learn with experience, then we would expect DiffError, 
DiffBias, and DiffRange to become more negative and DiffHorizon to become more 
positive over our sample period.21 
  
                                                 
20 We find in our untabulated tests that Inst is negative and significant when we use the untransformed 
values of Error and Range. 
21 This analysis is still subject to the possibility that general information environment changes could 
systematically affect frequent guiders more than occasional ones. 
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Table 1.5. Heckman Two-Stage Estimation of the Trends in Guidance Properties 
  
Error  Bias  Range  Horizon 
Sequence  ‐0.218***  ‐0.002***  0.039  0.052*** 
   (0.050)  (0.000)  (0.033)  (0.006) 
Size  ‐15.921***  ‐0.036**  ‐18.866***  0.162 
(3.400)  (0.014)  (3.782)  (0.362) 
Num  ‐46.028***  ‐0.014  ‐4.258  ‐0.409 
(6.124)  (0.057)  (4.755)  (0.805) 
Loss  0.340***  0.005***  0.158***  ‐0.002 
(0.052)  (0.001)  (0.033)  (0.006) 
Inst  1.807***  ‐0.008*  0.498***  ‐0.013 
(0.123)  (0.004)  (0.088)  (0.018) 
LagDV  ‐0.731***  ‐0.030  ‐0.529***  ‐0.025 
(0.143)  (0.052)  (0.117)  (0.109) 
Horizon  15.603***  0.016***  58.716*** 
(2.261)  (0.002)  (13.909) 
SOX  0.050  0.000  ‐0.029  ‐0.029*** 
(0.047)  (0.001)  (0.031)  (0.007) 
InvMills  ‐0.020  0.002  ‐0.032  ‐0.098*** 
(0.062)  (0.001)  (0.044)  (0.008) 
Firm Fixed Effects 
Included 
R‐Squared  0.44  0.253  0.68  0.48 
Firm‐Quarters  7075  7075  4157  8464 
The Heckman procedure consists of a first-stage probit estimation using Size, Num, Loss, Inst, ROA, 
MB, EarnVol, Cons, RetVol, and lag occurrence to predict the likelihood of guidance occurrence. The 
inverse mills ratio is used in the second-stage OLS estimation of the effect of guidance sequence on 
guidance properties. Sequence is the Nth guidance issued during the sample period. Size is the market 
value of equity. Num is the number of analysts following. Loss is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
firm reported a loss in that quarter. Inst is the proportion of common shares owned by institutional 
investors. LagDV is the value of the dependent variable in the prior fiscal period. Horizon is the number 
of days between guidance issuance and fiscal period end. SOX equals 1 if the observation is related to 
the post-Sox period (post 2002), and 0 otherwise. InvMills is the inverse mills ratio computed from the 
probit model in the first stage. Sequence, Size, Num, and Horizon are divided by 101, 106, 103, and 365, 
respectively, for expositional purposes. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the 2-
digit SIC and quarter level. Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p< .10, .05, or 









































Plots and statistical tests of the slope of DiffError, DiffBias, DiffRange, and 
DiffHorizon by year are provided in Figure 1.1. Examining the yearly patterns of 
DiffError yields interesting findings. As expected the trend is downward sloping and 
statistically significant. We find that in the early years the variable is positive but 
becomes smaller over time and becomes negative in the more recent years. This 
suggests that the early guidance by frequent guiders is actually less accurate than those 
by occasional guiders and that the frequent guiders get better over time surpassing the 
occasional guiders in accuracy. The results on bias are similar to those on error with a 
downward and statistically significant trend. The pattern indicates that the early 
guidance by frequent guiders is more optimistic than those of the occasional guiders 
while in the latter years the bias is almost the same across the two groups. The 
DiffRange variable does not show any pattern as is borne out by the statistical test. The 
DiffHorizon variable shows a significant positive trend that is consistent with the 
initial guidance for any period made by frequent guiders being earlier than the initial 
guidance made by occasional guiders. This finding is interesting because it suggests 
that the frequent guiders are getting better than the occasional guiders over time (more 
accurate, less optimistically biased and maintaining the range) despite issuing 
guidance progressively earlier.  
The results from this analysis also provide some evidence against the self-
selection form of learning. The finding that the guidance properties of frequent guiders 
in the early years are actually worse than the occasional guiders suggests that these 
firms did not continue to guide because they were initially better at it. Rather it seems 
that they continue to guide because of a policy or commitment to disclosure and they 
get better at it over time.  
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7. Additional Analyses 
7.1. Firm-Quarter Rolling Period Analysis and Learning  
The analysis in section 5 examining the relation between guidance frequency, 
guidance properties, and market response was carried out at the firm level. This 
ensures that a firm appears only once in the analysis and frequent guiders do not 
swamp the occasional ones in terms on the number of observations. In this section we 
relax that constraint and carry out the analyses at the firm-quarter level using a rolling 
period analysis. The advantage of this method is that it allows us to avoid peek-ahead 
bias. It also allows us to provide additional evidence on learning by evaluating 
whether accumulating guidance experience affects guidance properties. We use firms’ 
past guidance frequency (PastFrequency) as an alternative measure of guidance 
frequency. PastFrequency is the number of quarters a firm has issued guidance prior 
to the current fiscal period. Since PastFrequency varies over time, using this variable 
in our analysis also makes it possible for us to relax the assumption that a firm’s 
guidance practice is fixed over our 11 year sample period. The dynamic frequency 
variable also allows for inferences on learning. Since our variables are now measured 
at the quarter level, we also control for the effect of news in the market response tests. 
GoodNews (BadNews) is guidance news defined as management guidance less the 
most recent consensus forecast scaled by price if news is positive (negative) and zero 
otherwise.22 We expect positive coefficients on both GoodNews and BadNews if the 
market and analysts react appropriately to the news in the management forecast. To 
examine whether the market and analysts respond differently to frequent guiders per 
unit of news, we interact GoodNews and BadNews with PastFrequency. Atiase, 
Supattarakul, and Tse (2005) and Anilowski et al. (2007) find that a large proportion 
                                                 
22 Similar to how we estimate guidance error and bias, we use the manager point or open-ended estimate 
and the mid-point of range estimates to estimate guidance news. We are unable to calculate the news 
content or the accuracy of qualitative guidance issuances. 
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of firms are likely to provide guidance bundled along with an earnings announcement. 
Given that we are using the first guidance announced in the quarter, it is possible that 
our market reaction measures are affected by a concurrent announcement of earnings 
of the prior quarter. To control for this issue we include a variable to capture the 
concurrent earnings surprise. This variable (EANews) is measured as the difference 
between the concurrent earnings and analysts expectations scaled by price for the 
bundled guidance and zero for the non-bundled guidance. We also include a control 
variable AFE which is the difference between actual earnings for the guidance quarter 
and the prior consensus analysts forecast scaled by price. We also include firm fixed 
effects in this analysis to control for any correlated omitted variables when Error, 
Bias, Range, and Horizon are the dependent variables. We estimate the following 
models (firm and time subscripts have been suppressed): 
1 2 3 4 5 6
                                                                                                         (2 )   
Error PastFrequency Size Num Loss Horizon Inst
FirmFixedEffects b
β β β β β β
ε
= + + + + +
+ +  
1 2 3 4 5 6
                                                                                                         (3 )   
Bias PastFrequency Size Num Loss Horizon Inst
FirmFixedEffects b
β β β β β β
ε
= + + + + +
+ +  
1 2 3 4 5 6
                                                                                                         (4 )   
Range PastFrequency Size Num Loss Horizon Inst
FirmFixedEffects b
β β β β β β
ε
= + + + + +
+ +  
1 2 3 4 5
                                                                                                         (5 )   
Horizon PastFrequency Size Num Loss Inst
FirmFixedEffects b
β β β β β
ε
= + + + +
+ +  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
12
                        
                        
MktReaction PastFrequency EANews AFE Size Num Loss Horizon
Inst GoodNews BadNews PastFrequency GoodNews
PastFrequency BadNews
β β β β β β β
β β β β
β
= + + + + + +
+ + + + ×
+ ×                                                              (6 )   bε+
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
12
                           
                           
ChgConsensus PastFrequency EANews AFE Size Num Loss Horizon
Inst GoodNews BadNews PastFrequency GoodNews
PastFrequency
β β β β β β β
β β β β
β
= + + + + + +
+ + + + ×




Table 1.6. Past Guidance Frequency and Guidance Properties 
  
Error  Bias  Range  Horizon  MktReaction  ChgConsensus
PastFrequency  ‐0.001***  ‐0.002***  0.000  0.059***  0.017***  0.001*** 





Size  ‐0.038***  ‐0.030***  ‐0.016***  0.122  0.000  0.000 
(0.008)  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.177)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Num  ‐0.181***  ‐0.038  ‐0.040***  2.324***  ‐0.561***  ‐0.024*** 
(0.032)  (0.046)  (0.009)  (0.640)  (0.211)  (0.006) 
Loss  0.003***  0.005***  0.001***  0.003  ‐0.014***  ‐0.000 
(0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.000) 
Horizon  0.013***  0.015***  0.001***  0.042***  ‐0.000 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.000) 
Inst  ‐0.006***  ‐0.007**  ‐0.002***  0.011  0.002  0.000 
(0.001)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.000) 
GoodNews  0.537**  0.028 
(0.263)  (0.026) 





      (0.076)  (0.007) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  N 
R‐squared  0.458  0.261  0.716  0.456  0.082  0.624 
Firm‐Quarters  8636  8636  5679  9759  7208  6709 
PastFrequency is the number of guidance issued prior to the current fiscal quarter. EANews is the 
earnings announcement news scaled by price. AFE is actual EPS minus prevailing analyst’ mean 
consensus forecast. Size is the market value of equity. Num is the number of analysts following. Loss is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a loss in that quarter. Horizon is the number of days 
between guidance issuance and fiscal period end. Inst is the proportion of common shares owned by 
institutional investors. GoodNews (BadNews) is guidance news defined as the management guidance 
less the most recent consensus forecast scaled by price if news is positive (negative). Bias is guidance 
less actual EPS, scaled by price. Error is the absolute value of Bias. Horizon is the number of days 
between guidance issuance and fiscal period end. MktReaction is the three-day cumulative adjusted 
returns centered on guidance issuance date. ChgConsensus is the difference in analysts’ mean 
consensus forecasts scaled by price. PastFrequency, Size, Num, and Horizon are divided by 10, 106, 103, 
and 365, respectively, for expositional purposes. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at 
the 2-digit SIC and quarter level. Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p< .10, .05, 
or .01, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 1.6 provides results examining the effect of past guidance frequency on 
guidance properties. The main independent variable in this analysis, PastFrequency, is 
the sum of guidance frequency from the beginning of our sample period to the last 
quarter. Consistent with results from the earlier tests, the coefficients on 
PastFrequency suggest that guidance frequency is negatively associated with Error (
1β = -0.001, p < 0.01) and Bias ( 1β = -0.002, p < 0.01) and positively associated with 
Horizon ( 1β = 0.059, p < 0.01). The coefficient on PastFrequency is positive but non-
significant for guidance range. The results also suggest that guidance experience is 
related to the properties of guidance which is consistent with the results on learning 
documented earlier.  
The last two columns provide results examining the effect of past guidance 
frequency on market and analysts’ reactions to guidance. The positive coefficient on 
PastFrequency is consistent with frequent guiders enjoying a premium when they 
issue guidance ( 1β = 0.017 and 0.001, p < 0.01 and p < 0.01). The coefficients on 
BadNews ( 10β = 4.022 and 0.720, p < 0.01 and p < 0.01) are also positive and larger 
than that for GoodNews ( 9β  = 0.537 and 0.028, p < 0.05 and p>0.10) as expected. 
Consistent with investors adjusting for greater accuracy and less optimistic bias in 
guidance issued by frequent guiders as compared with occasional guiders, the 
coefficient on PastFrequency×GoodNews is positive and significant ( 11β = 0.096, p < 
0.01). The coefficient on PastFrequency×BadNews is negative and significant ( 9β =-
0.163, p < 0.05) which suggests that markets adjust for the less optimistic bias of 
frequent guiders as compared with occasional guiders.  
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Table 1.7. Robustness Test: Post 1998 Data 
  
Error  Bias  Range  Horizon  MktReaction  ChgConsensus
PastFrequency  ‐0.001***  ‐0.002***  0.000  0.051***  0.013***  0.000 





Size  ‐0.030***  ‐0.021**  ‐0.015***  0.039  0.053  0.001 
(0.008)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.210)  (0.046)  (0.001) 
Num  ‐0.202***  ‐0.047  ‐0.040***  2.379***  ‐0.545**  ‐0.022*** 
(0.036)  (0.049)  (0.009)  (0.731)  (0.213)  (0.006) 
Loss  0.003***  0.005***  0.001***  0.002  ‐0.014***  ‐0.000 
(0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.000) 
Horizon  0.014***  0.017***  0.001***  0.034***  ‐0.000 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.000) 
Inst  ‐0.006***  ‐0.008**  ‐0.002***  0.000  0.003  0.000 
(0.001)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.007)  (0.000) 
GoodNews  0.366  ‐0.010 
(0.376)  (0.016) 





      (0.081)  (0.006) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  N 
R‐squared  0.474  0.265  0.715  0.456  0.078  0.689 
Firm‐Quarters  7942  7942  5447  9002  6156  5875 
This table includes only management forecasts made during 1998-2005 for the firms in our main 
sample. PastFrequency is the number of guidance issued prior to the current fiscal quarter. EANews is 
the earnings announcement news scaled by price. AFE is actual EPS minus prevailing analyst’ mean 
consensus forecast. Size is the market value of equity. Num is the number of analysts following. Loss is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a loss in that quarter. Horizon is the number of days 
between guidance issuance and fiscal period end. Inst is the proportion of common shares owned by 
institutional investors. GoodNews (BadNews) is guidance news defined as the management guidance 
less the most recent consensus forecast scaled by price if news is positive (negative). Bias is guidance 
less actual EPS, scaled by price. Error is the absolute value of Bias. Horizon is the number of days 
between guidance issuance and fiscal period end. MktReaction is the three-day cumulative adjusted 
returns centered on guidance issuance date. ChgConsensus is the difference in analysts’ mean 
consensus forecasts scaled by price. PastFrequency, Size, Num, and Horizon are divided by 10, 106, 103, 
and 365, respectively, for expositional purposes. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at 
the 2-digit SIC and quarter level. Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p< .10, .05, 
or .01, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 40 
Table 1.8. Robustness Test: Full Sample 
  
Error  Bias  Range  Horizon  MktReaction  ChgConsensus
PastFrequency  ‐0.001***  ‐0.002***  0.000  0.055***  0.018***  0.002*** 





Size  ‐0.059***  ‐0.045***  ‐0.017***  0.235  0.042  0.000 
(0.022)  (0.017)  (0.005)  (0.193)  (0.047)  (0.001) 
Num  ‐0.180***  ‐0.007  ‐0.041***  2.031***  ‐0.560***  ‐0.002 
(0.030)  (0.030)  (0.008)  (0.557)  (0.204)  (0.008) 
Loss  0.004***  0.004***  0.001***  ‐0.000  ‐0.015***  ‐0.001** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.000) 
Horizon  0.014***  0.012***  0.001***  0.038***  0.001* 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.000) 
Inst  ‐0.005***  ‐0.002**  ‐0.002***  0.012  0.006  0.001** 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.000) 
GoodNews  0.949***  0.122*** 
(0.336)  (0.046) 





      (0.075)  (0.012) 
Firm Fixed Effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  N 
R‐squared  0.446  0.448  0.665  0.455  0.073  0.593 
Firm‐Quarters  12552  12552  9003  14805  10641  10052 
This table includes all management forecasts made during 1995-2005 and does not require firms to be 
in existence throughout entire sample period. PastFrequency is the number of guidance issued prior to 
the current fiscal quarter. EANews is the earnings announcement news scaled by price. AFE is actual 
EPS minus prevailing analyst’ mean consensus forecast. Size is the market value of equity. Num is the 
number of analysts following. Loss is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a loss in that 
quarter. Horizon is the number of days between guidance issuance and fiscal period end. Inst is the 
proportion of common shares owned by institutional investors. GoodNews (BadNews) is guidance news 
defined as the management guidance less the most recent consensus forecast scaled by price if news is 
positive (negative). Bias is guidance less actual EPS, scaled by price. Error is the absolute value of 
Bias. Horizon is the number of days between guidance issuance and fiscal period end. MktReaction is 
the three-day cumulative adjusted returns centered on guidance issuance date. ChgConsensus is the 
difference in analysts’ mean consensus forecasts scaled by price. PastFrequency, Size, Num, and 
Horizon are divided by 10, 106, 103, and 365, respectively, for expositional purposes. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses are clustered at the 2-digit SIC and quarter level. Coefficients marked with a *, 
**, or *** are significant at p< .10, .05, or .01, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 1.9. Guidance Frequency and Guidance Properties (Medians) 
   Error  Bias Range
OLS  2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS  2SLS
MGQuintile  ‐0.002***  ‐0.002*** ‐0.002*** ‐0.002*** ‐0.001***  ‐0.001**
   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Log(Size)  ‐0.000  ‐0.000 ‐0.000 ‐0.000 ‐0.001***  ‐0.001***
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
Num  ‐0.036  ‐0.124 0.088 ‐0.010 0.023  ‐0.004
(0.090)  (0.076) (0.087) (0.081) (0.020)  (0.015)
Loss  0.005  0.002 0.002 ‐0.003 0.004***  0.004***
(0.003)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001)
Horizon  0.013***  0.013*** 0.009* 0.011*** 0.001*  0.001
(0.004)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)  (0.001)
LitRisk  0.001  ‐0.001 0.001 ‐0.001 ‐0.001**  ‐0.001**
(0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000)
Inst  ‐0.001  ‐0.003** 0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.000  ‐0.001
(0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000)
R‐squared  0.058  0.063 0.026 0.041 0.155  0.148
Firms  1575  1504 1575 1504 1270  1241
   Horizon MktReaction ChgConsensus
   OLS  2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS  2SLS
MGQuintile  0.030***  0.030*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.001***  0.001***
   (0.002)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000)
Log(Size)  0.006*  0.005 0.002 0.003 0.001**  0.000*
(0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000)
Num  ‐0.219  1.607 0.254 0.277 0.028  0.070*
(1.055)  (1.011) (0.473) (0.472) (0.037)  (0.036)
Loss  0.023*  0.022 ‐0.005 ‐0.007 0.000  0.000
(0.014)  (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.001)  (0.001)
Horizon  0.061*** 0.059*** 0.004**  0.004***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.001)  (0.001)
LitRisk  ‐0.006  0.009 0.008 0.012* ‐0.000  0.000
(0.009)  (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000)  (0.000)
Inst  0.009  0.070*** 0.004 0.018 0.000  0.002**
(0.017)  (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.001)  (0.001)
R‐squared  0.124  0.117 0.036 0.049 0.066  0.062
Firms  1667  1584 1651 1569 1421  1398
This table presents OLS and 2SLS tests of the association between guidance frequency and guidance 
properties. The 2SLS specification uses the error term from regressing MGQuintile on Loss, LitRisk, 
Beta, Inst, Num, MBAnalyst, and Disp from the first-stage as an instrumental variable for MGQuintile in 
the second-stage regressions. The results in the table reflect the second-stage regressions. See Appendix 
for variable definitions. Size, Num, and Horizon are divided by 106, 103, and 365, respectively, for 
expositional purposes. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the 2-digit SIC level. 
Coefficients marked with a *, **, or *** are significant at p< .10, .05, or .01, respectively, using a two-
tailed test.  
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7.2. Alternative Sample Selection Specifications 
7.2.1. Post 1998 Data.. Anilowski et al. (2007) find an increase in the number 
of forecasts in the database starting in 1998. We choose to use the longer sample 
period because that increases the power of our primary variable of interest (identifying 
frequent guiders), especially in the learning analysis in section 5. We believe that 
ignoring information relating to known guidance quarters prior to 1998 and assuming 
that a firm commences learning in 1998 is an inferior sample selection choice. On the 
other hand, it is possible that prior to 1998, First Call did not record guidance 
issuances from smaller firms that were less well-followed by analysts. This would 
cause these firms to be incorrectly classified as occasional guiders when in reality they 
could have been frequent guiders. However this type of potential misclassification 
would work against our hypotheses by reducing our ability to distinguish between 
frequent and occasional guiders. To examine the robustness of our results, we also 
carry out analyses using a sample that commences in 1998. The results of this analysis 
which are provided in Table 1.7 are similar to those from the primary sample.  
7.2.2. Full Sample. Our primary sample is based on firms that are on 
Compustat throughout the sample period. We also examine the robustness of our 
results to this specification by using the entire sample of firms. With the exception of 
the analysis on change in analysts’ consensus, the results that are provided in Table 
1.8 are largely consistent with the results using our primary sample. The last column 
shows that the coefficient on PastFrequency×GoodNews is negative ( 11β = -0.008, p < 
0.1) and the coefficient on PastFrequency×BadNews is positive ( 12β = 0.052, p < 
0.01).23  
                                                 
23 For robustness, we also control for the number of quarters (Quarters) where Quarters is the number 
of quarters a firm is on Compustat during our sample period when we do not include firm fixed effects. 
The untabulated results are similar to those presented in Table 8.  
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7.3. Analysis Using Medians  
The firm level analysis in section 4 examining the association between 
guidance frequency, guidance properties and market response was carried out using 
the mean values of the dependent and independent variables. We also carry out the 
same analysis using the median values by firm. As Table 1.9 indicates, the results 
using this specification are similar to the results documented earlier using the mean 
values.  
8. Summary 
This paper attempts to further our understanding of guidance behavior by firms 
and market participants’ responses to the guidance. The study differs from previous 
and contemporaneous work in several ways. First, unlike most prior work, we examine 
whether a firm’s propensity to issue guidance is related to the properties of the 
guidance as well as market responses to the guidance. Our results suggest that the 
characteristics and market responses to guidance issued by occasional and frequent 
guiders differ. Compared to occasional guiders, frequent guiders issue guidance in a 
timelier manner and their guidance is less biased, more accurate, and more precise. 
Firms committed to issuing guidance also appear to invest in improving the quality of 
their guidance, as evidenced by improvements in guidance accuracy. Lastly, we 
extend the literature by examining whether frequent guiders exhibit patterns in their 
guidance behavior over time that is consistent with learning. While our results are 
consistent with an improvement in firms’ guidance quality over time, we acknowledge 
that a caveat of our results is that we are unable to examine how firms learn. 
Our results are consistent with frequency being an important classificatory 
variable, with frequent guiders representing a class or type of firm that commits to 
increased levels of disclosure through their guidance and therefore have different 
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incentives and processes that affect the properties of the guidance, its market impact, 










































Ajinkya, B. and M. Gift. “Corporate managers’ earnings forecasts and symmetrical 
adjustments of market expectations.” Journal of Accounting Research 22 
(1984): 425-444.  
Ajinkya, B., S. Bhojraj, and P. Sengupta. “The association between outside directors, 
institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts.” 
Journal of Accounting Research 43 (2005): 343-376 
Anilowski, C., M. Feng, and D. Skinner. “Does earnings guidance affect market 
returns? The nature and information content of aggregate earnings guidance.” 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 44 (2007): 36-63. 
Arrow, K. ‘Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention,’ in R. R. 
Nelson (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton 
University Press: Princeton, NJ, (1962): 609–625. 
Atiase, R., H. Li, S. Supattarakul, and S. Tse. “Market reaction to multiple 
contemporaneous earnings signals: Earnings announcements and future 
earnings guidance.” Review of Accounting Studies 10 (2005): 497-525. 
Baik, B., and G. Jiang. “The use of management forecasts to dampen analysts’ 
expectations.” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 25 (2006): 531-553. 
Baginski, S. P., E. J. Conrad, and J. M. Hassell. “The effects of management forecast 
precision on equity pricing and on the assessment of earnings uncertainty.” The 
Accounting Review 68 (1993): 913-927. 
Bamber, L. S. and Y. S. Cheon. “Discretionary management earnings forecast 
disclosures: Antecedents and outcomes associated with forecast venue and 
forecast specificity choices.” Journal of Accounting Research 36 (1998): 167-
190. 
Bartov, E., D. Givoly, and C. Hayn. “The rewards to meeting or beating analysts’ 
consensus forecasts.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (2002): 173-
204. 
Bhojraj, S., P. Hribar, J. McInnis, and M. Picconi. “Making sense of cents: An 
examination of firms that marginally meet or beat analyst forecasts.” Journal 
of Finance 64 (2009): 2361-2388. 
Brown, S., S. Hillegeist, and K. Lo. “Conference calls and information asymmetry.” 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 37 (2004): 343-366. 
Bushee, B. and C. Noe. “Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and 
stock return volatility.” Journal of Accounting Research 30 (2000): 171-202. 
 47 
Chen, S., D. Matsumoto, and S. Rajgopal. “Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of 
firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance.” Working Paper, University 
of Washington, 2007. 
Clement, M., R. Frankel, and J. Miller. “Confirming management earnings forecasts, 
earnings uncertainty, and stock returns.” Journal of Accounting Research 41 
(2003): 653-679. 
Coller, M. and T. Yohn. “Management forecasts and information asymmetry.” Journal 
of Accounting Research 35 (1997): 181-191. 
Cotter, J., I. Tuna, and P. Wysocki. “Expectations management and beatable targets: 
How do analysts react to explicit earnings guidance?” Contemporary 
Accounting Research 23 (2006): 593-624. 
Einhorn, H. and R. Hogarth. “Confidence in judgment: Persistence in the illusion of 
validity.” Psychological Review 85 (1978): 395-416. 
Feng, M. and A. Koch. “Once bitten twice shy: The relation between outcomes of 
earnings guidance and management guidance strategy.” Working Paper, 
University of Pittsburgh, 2008. 
Feng, M., C. Li, and S. McVay. “Internal control and management guidance.” Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 48 (2009) 190-209. 
Francis, J., D. Philbrick, and K. Schipper. “Shareholder litigation and corporate 
disclosure.” Journal of Accounting Research 32 (1994): 137-164. 
Givoly, D. and C. Hayn. “The changing time-serires properties of earnings, cash flows 
and accruals: Has financial accounting become more conservative?” Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 29 (2000): 287-320. 
Graham, J., C. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal. “The economic implications of corporate 
financial reporting.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 40 (2005): 3-73. 
Houston, J., B. Lev, and J. Tucker. “To guide or not to guide? Causes and 
consequences of stopping quarterly earnings guidance.” Forthcoming, 
Contemporary Accounting Research. 
Huber, G. P. “Organizational learning: The contributing processes and the literature.” 
Organization Science 2 (1991): 88-115.  
Hui, K. W., S. Matsunaga, and D. Morse. “The impact of conservatism on 
management quantitative earnings forecasts.” Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 47 (2009): 192-207. 
 48 
Hutton, A. and P. Stocken. “Prior forecasting accuracy and investor reaction to 
management earnings forecasts.” Working Paper, Boston College, 2009. 
Jennings, R. “Unsystematic security price movements, management earnings 
forecasts, and revisions in consensus analyst earnings forecasts.” Journal of 
Accounting Research 25 (1987): 90-110. 
Kasznik, R. and B. Lev. “To warn or not to warn: Management disclosures in the face 
of an earnings surprise.” The Accounting Review 70 (1995): 113-134. 
Kasznik, R. and M. McNichols. “Does meeting earnings expectations matter? 
Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices.” Journal of 
Accounting Research 40 (2002): 727-759. 
Ke, B. and Y. Yu. “The effect of issuing biased earnings forecasts on analysts’ access 
to management and survival.” Journal of Accounting Research 44 (2006): 965-
1000. 
King, R., G. Pownall, and G. Waymire. “Expectations adjustment via timely earnings 
forecast disclosure: review, synthesis and suggestions for future research.” 
Journal of Accounting Literature 9 (1990): 113-144. 
Lang, M. and R. Lundholm. “Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior.” The 
Accounting Review 71 (1996): 467-492. 
Leuz, C. and R. Verrecchia. “The economic consequences of increased disclosure.” 
Journal of Accounting Research 38 (2000): 91-124. 
Lev, B. and S. Penman. “Voluntary forecast disclosure, nondisclosure, and stock 
prices.” Journal of Accounting Research 28 (1990): 49-76. 
Libby, R., H. T. Tan, and J. E. Hutton. “Does the form of management earnings 
guidance affect analysts’ earnings forecasts?” The Accounting Review 81 
(2006): 207-226. 
Libby, R., J. E. Hunton, H. T. Tan, and N. Seybert. “Relationship incentives and the 
optimistic/pessimistic pattern in analysts’ forecasts.” Journal of Accounting 
Research 46 (2008): 173-198.  
Mikhail, M., B. Walther, and R. Willis. “Do security analysts improve their 
performance with experience?” Journal of Accounting Research 35 (1997): 
131-157. 
Miller, G. “Earnings performance and discretionary disclosure.” Journal of 
Accounting Research 40 (2002): 173-204. 
 49 
Nagar, V., D. Nanda, and P. Wysocki. “Discretionary disclosure and stock-based 
incentives.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 34 (2003): 283-309. 
Patell, J. M. “Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price behavior: 
Empirical tests.” Journal of Accounting Research 14 (1976): 246-276. 
Penman, S. H. “An empirical investigation of the voluntary disclosure of corporate 
earnings forecasts.” Journal of Accounting Research 18 (1980): 132-160. 
Richardson, S., S. H. Teoh, and P. Wysocki. “The walk-down to beatable analyst 
forecasts: The role of equity issuance and insider trading incentives.” 
Contemporary Accounting Research 21 (2004): 885-924. 
Rogers, J., D. Skinner, and A. Van Buskirk. “Earnings guidance and market 
uncertainty.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 48 (2009): 90-109. 
Skinner, D. “Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news.” Journal of Accounting 
Research 32 (1994): 38-60. 
Skinner, D. “Earnings disclosures and stockholder lawsuits.” Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 23 (1997): 249-282. 
Soffer, L., R. Thiagarajan, and B. Walther. “Earnings preannouncement strategies.” 
Review of Accounting Studies 5 (2000): 5-26. 
Venkataraman, S., D. E. Hirst, and L. Koonce. “Management earnings forecasts: A 
review and framework.” Accounting Horizons 22 (2008): 315-338. 
Verrecchia, R. “Discretionary disclosure.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 5 
(1983): 179-194. 
Verrecchia, R. “Information quality and discretionary disclosure.” Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 12 (1990): 365-380. 
Wang, I. “Private earnings guidance and its implications for disclosure regulation.” 
The Accounting Review 82 (2007): 1299-1332. 
Waymire, G. “Earnings volatility and voluntary management forecast disclosure.” 
Journal of Accounting Research 23 (1985): 268-295. 
Williams, P. A. “The relation between a prior earnings forecast by management and 
analyst response to a current management forecast.” The Accounting Review 71 
(1996): 103-115. 
Zollo, M. and S. Winter. “Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic 
capabilities.” Organization Science 13 (2002): 339-351. 
 50 
CHAPTER TWO: 
THE EFFECTS OF MANAGERS’ GUIDANCE CREDIBILITY ON 
INVESTORS AND ANALYSTS 
Abstract 
I examine whether investors and analysts recognize differences in individual 
managers’ guidance accuracy and bias, and if they tailor their responses to 
management guidance. I find that investors react more strongly and assign more 
credibility to managers who have greater guidance accuracy, and that investors adjust 
for guidance bias by reacting more positively (less negatively) to good (bad) news 
guidance issued by managers who are more pessimistic. However, the results for the 
changes in analysts’ consensus forecasts suggest that analyst experience plays an 
important role in their responses to management guidance. I find that in their forecast 
revisions, analysts adjust for managers’ guidance accuracy and bias only if the 
analysts themselves have sufficient forecasting experience.  
 




“Here’s the screw-up: You made a promise that you'd deliver this and you missed 
three weeks later.  Jeff [Immelt] has a credibility issue. He's getting his a-- kicked. He 
apologized." – former GE CEO Jack Welch on his successor Jeffrey Immelt after GE 
promised that the company would meet expectations but subsequently reported a 6% 
fall in earnings. (CNBC April 2008) 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines whether investors and analysts recognize differences in 
managers’ guidance accuracy and bias, and if they tailor their responses to 
management guidance. Managers’ influence on firm policies has gained interest in the 
accounting literature recently and several studies provide evidence consistent with 
managers’ individual preferences having an effect on firms’ voluntary disclosure and 
financial reporting decisions.1 In this study, I build on this growing stream of literature 
and investigate whether market participants recognize differences in individual 
managers’ voluntary disclosure behavior. I examine whether investors and analysts 
incorporate differences in managers’ guidance accuracy and bias into their responses 
to firms’ earnings guidance. 
Although management credibility is an intensively researched topic, little is 
known about how investors and analysts assess the credibility of individual managers. 
Prior work examining the effects of firms’ guidance behavior on analysts and 
investors shows that analysts and investors find earnings guidance to be more 
believable if firms issued guidance with higher accuracy in the past (Williams 1996; 
Hutton and Stocken 2009). Experimental evidence also suggests that analysts and 
investors perceive management as more credible and trustworthy if it has issued 
earnings warnings prior to a negative earnings surprise or if it has followed certain 
preannouncement strategies (Libby and Tan 1999; Tan, Libby, and Hunton 2002). 
However, prior studies that examine the credibility of earnings guidance generally 
assume that a firm’s guidance record is attached to the firm or its management team, 
and do not differentiate between the reputation of a firm and that of an individual 
manager (Williams 1996; Libby and Tan 1999; Tan et al. 2002; Rogers and Stocken 
                                                 
1 See Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2008), Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 
(2009), Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang (2009).   
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2005; Hutton and Stocken 2009). A growing number of studies provide evidence 
indicating that managers play a significant role in determining firms’ accounting 
decisions (Bamber et al. 2008; Ge et al. 2009). These studies examine the effect of 
individual managers’ styles on firms’ voluntary disclosure and financial reporting 
decisions, and find that individual manager characteristics explain much of the 
variation in firms’ earnings guidance and accounting choices. Therefore, in this study, 
I distinguish between firm and manager-level behavior by examining the effects of 
guidance credibility at the level of the individual manager. Whether market 
participants recognize and adjust for differences in managers’ guidance behavior is an 
important empirical question, because in a rational expectations environment, 
investors should, and do, adjust for the predicted bias in firms’ guidance issuances 
(Fischer and Verrecchia 2000; Rogers and Stocken 2005). However, if investors and 
analysts do not expect to find any differences in individual managers’ guidance styles, 
it is questionable whether they will identify and adjust for the manager-specific effects 
in their reactions to firms’ earnings guidance.  
I begin my analysis by measuring the manager effects of individual managers 
on firms’ guidance accuracy and bias. I use the ExecuComp database to identify 
managers who are employed by at least two firms with a minimum of three years’ 
tenure in each firm. I also require that managers must have issued guidance during 
their tenure at each firm. This sample selection restriction makes it possible for me to 
separate the effects of managers from firm and year fixed effects. The manager 
positions in my sample include the CEOs, CFOs, and other top executives listed in the 
ExecuComp database. I examine the effects of managers on their earnings guidance by 
estimating management guidance accuracy and bias as a function of manager fixed 
effects, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and additional control variables. This 
approach generates a parameter estimate of each manager’s effect on his/her firm’s 
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guidance issuances. Following prior research, I measure guidance credibility as the 
stock price reaction or analyst response to guidance (Jennings 1987; Williams 1996; 
Hutton and Stocken 2009). This provides a joint test of whether market participants 
recognize and also adjust for managers’ guidance differences. My results show that 
investors take into account managers’ guidance behavior when responding to firms’ 
guidance. I find that investors assign more credibility to accurate managers by reacting 
more positively (negatively) to their good (bad) news, and that they also adjust for 
guidance bias by reacting more positively to good news and less negatively to bad 
news guidance issued by pessimistic managers. 
However, my results on the change in analysts’ consensus forecasts in 
response to management guidance suggest that analysts only consider managers’ 
guidance behavior when responding to bad news, but not to good news guidance. My 
finding of an asymmetric analyst response to good news and bad news could be 
attributable to two explanations: 1) the inherent credibility of bad news and 2) lack of 
experience for novice analysts. I conduct additional analyses and provide results that 
are consistent with analyst forecasting experience playing a role in their responses to 
management guidance. When I separate analysts’ individual forecasts into two groups 
based on their general forecasting experience, I find that analysts with above average 
experience take into account manager’s guidance accuracy and bias into their 
responses for both good news and bad news guidance. Consistent with an asymmetric 
response to different types of news, the changes in analysts’ forecasts are also stronger 
for bad news than for good news.  
The above results indicate that investors and experienced analysts recognize 
and adjust for the heterogeneity in managers’ guidance behavior. These findings 
should be of interest to academics as they document that manager-specific guidance 
behavior, which has been mostly ignored in the literature, is a significant determinant 
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of management credibility. These findings should also be of interest to practitioners, 
as they suggest that managers’ concerns about establishing a reputation for accurate 
and transparent voluntary disclosures are legitimized by investors’ and analysts’ 
reactions to management guidance. 
This paper makes the following contributions: First, it adds to the vast 
literature on voluntary disclosures by documenting the effects of managers on firms’ 
earnings guidance. With the exception of Bamber et al. (2008) and Brochet, Faurel, 
and McVay (2009), the literature on management guidance to date has mostly ignored 
the effects of managers and focused mainly on examining the relation between 
guidance outcomes and temporal firm characteristics. For example, prior studies argue 
that firms are more likely to issue guidance when analysts are optimistic (Cotter, Tuna, 
and Wysocki 2006), when litigation risk is high (Skinner 1994), when communicating 
bad news (Kasznik and Lev 1995), and when analyst following and institutional 
ownership are high (Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta 2005). This study adds to the 
management guidance literature by showing that managers also have a significant 
impact on guidance properties, incremental to firm and year fixed effects and time-
varying firm characteristics. The results also indicate that there is significant variation 
in managers’ guidance credibility with some managers being more accurate than 
others. 
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on market responses to guidance 
and documents that individual managers’ guidance behavior is recognized by both 
investors and analysts. My results complement prior studies that examine the effects of 
firms’ guidance credibility (Williams 1996; Libby and Tan 1999; Tan et al. 2002; 
Rogers and Stocken 2005; Hutton and Stocken 2009) by documenting that manager-
specific credibility also plays an important role beyond firm-specific effects. Finally, 
three concurrent studies employ a similar methodology to investigate whether 
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managers have unique styles of their own that are reflected in the earnings guidance, 
financial reporting, and tax avoidance choices of the firms for which they work 
(Bamber et al. 2008; Dyreng et al. 2009; Ge et al. 2009).2 I extend this burgeoning 
stream of literature on manager-specific effects by examining whether these effects are 
recognized by market participants. To my knowledge, this is the first study to 
document the consequences to managers for having a style of his/her own.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews prior literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section III describes my data sources and the research 
design. I report descriptive statistics and empirical results in sections IV and V. 
Section VI discusses additional analyses. Section VII concludes.  
2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Manager Effects on Earnings Guidance 
My paper is related to prior research that examines the effects of managers on 
corporate behavior. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) study differences in “style” for a set 
of 500 managers listed in the ExecuComp database from 1992 to 1999. These authors 
follow managers across different firms over time to examine whether systematic 
manager effects are correlated with a wide range of firm policies. Their results 
indicate that manager-specific effects explain a significant portion of the heterogeneity 
we observe in firms’ investing, financing, and organizational practices. They also find 
that a manager’s style is related to his/her educational background and birth cohort 
with MBA degree-holders being more aggressive and older managers being more 
conservative. 
                                                 
2 Dyreng et al. (2009) examine the effects of managers on firms’ effective tax rates while Ge et al. 
(2009) examine the effects of CFOs on a range of corporate financial reporting choices and outcomes. 
The variables examined include discretionary accruals, operating leases, expected rate of return for 
pension assets, earnings smoothing, likelihood of meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts, and the likelihood 
of accounting misstatements. 
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Several recent studies in the finance and accounting literature provide evidence 
of a relation between CEO characteristics and firm policies or CEO personal events 
and firm performance. For example, Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that 
overconfident CEOs are more acquisitive; Schrand and Zechman (2009) find that 
overconfident executives are more likely to commit fraud. Bennedson, Perez-
Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2007) and Liu and Yermack (2007) show that declines in 
firm performance are correlated with deaths of CEO family members and with 
purchases of personal real estate. Malmendier and Tate (2009) report evidence that 
CEOs who are named as “Best Managers” by Business Week underperform relative to 
their peers after winning the award. 
Despite the findings in the finance and earnings management literature, 
attention to the effects of managers in the voluntary disclosure literature has been 
limited. Brochet et al. (2009) examine management guidance that is issued around 
CFO turnovers and shed light on how managers affect firms’ guidance. While their 
focus is not on an individual manager’s guidance behavior over time, their findings are 
consistent with managers playing an important role in the guidance issuance process. 
Bamber et al. (2008) examine the role of managers by using a sample of earnings 
guidance issuances from 1995 to 2005. Their results also indicate that managers have 
a significant impact on firms’ guidance, and that in most cases, CEOs matter more 
than CFOs. Bamber et al. (2008) also find that manager-specific guidance styles are 
correlated with observable managerial characteristics. Their results indicate that 
managers born prior to World War II and managers with MBA degrees are more 
conservative.3 
                                                 
3 Although Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Ge et al. (2009) do not examine the effects of managers on 
guidance, they find that managers with MBA degrees in their samples are more aggressive in their 
capital expenditure and financial reporting decisions.  
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Although the contemporaneous studies discussed above examine the effects of 
managers on guidance, they do not examine whether differences in managers’ 
guidance accuracy and bias affect their personal reputation. Because I am interested in 
the reputational effects to managers, I focus on two guidance outcomes that prior 
research has shown to affect investors’ and analysts’ reactions to guidance: accuracy 
and bias.  
2.2. Investors’ and Analysts’ Reactions to Guidance 
Prior research provides both empirical and experimental evidence on investors’ 
and analysts’ reactions to management guidance. When controlling for the total 
amount of news, Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther (2000) find that firms that issue 
pessimistic preannouncement news have less negative returns than firms that are 
optimistic, i.e., firms can affect the overall market reaction to news by adopting a 
pessimistic disclosure strategy. Rogers and Stocken (2005) report that firms are more 
likely to bias guidance when it is harder for investors to assess the truthfulness of their 
guidance. Their tests of the stock price response to guidance also suggest that 
investors filter out the bias in good news guidance and extreme observations of bad 
news guidance.  Hutton and Stocken (2009) examine whether investors find guidance 
more credible if it is issued by a firm with a guidance reputation and they find that 
investors’ reactions to guidance news increase with a firm’s prior guidance accuracy. 
These three studies suggest that the market takes into account firms’ guidance 
accuracy and bias in their responses to guidance. 
Williams (1996) examines the relation between analysts’ forecast revisions and 
firms’ prior guidance accuracy. She finds that changes in the analysts’ consensus to 
good news guidance are greater if the firm’s guidance that was issued in the prior 
period was more accurate. However, changes in the analysts’ consensus in response to 
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bad news guidance are not conditional on firms’ prior guidance accuracy. Tan et al. 
(2002) conduct an experiment to examine how analysts’ forecasts are affected by 
firms’ guidance strategies. They find that analysts forecast the highest earnings for 
firms that overstate (understate) the magnitude of their total negative (positive) news, 
i.e., firms that issue pessimistic guidance receive higher analysts’ forecasts. Although 
the discussion above suggests that the accuracy and bias of firm’s guidance affect 
analysts, other studies provide indirect evidence that analysts may not always respond 
appropriately to management guidance. Matsumoto (2002) and Cotter et al. (2006) 
examine the effects on analysts of private and public earnings guidance and find that 
firms are more likely to meet or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts when guidance is 
provided in the quarter. However, they do not directly test the association between 
guidance accuracy and bias on changes in analysts’ consensus forecasts. Therefore, 
their results could be attributable either to firms issuing pessimistic guidance and 
analysts responding accordingly, or to firms issuing accurate guidance and analysts 
not fully adjusting their forecasts, or both. 
My discussion of prior research suggests that guidance accuracy and bias are 
the main determinants of management credibility for both investors and analysts.  
However, none of these studies addresses the determinants at the individual manager 
level, despite managers’ beliefs of developing a reputation for voluntary disclosures 
(Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). Therefore, based on the discussion above, my 
hypotheses are as follows: 
H1a: Investors’ reactions to good (bad) news guidance are stronger for 
managers with higher guidance accuracy. 
H1b: Investors’ reactions to good (bad) news guidance are more positive (less 
negative) for managers with higher guidance pessimism. 
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H2a: Analysts’ reactions to good (bad) news guidance are stronger for 
managers with higher guidance accuracy. 
H2b: Analysts’ reactions to good (bad) news guidance are more positive (less 
negative) for managers with higher guidance pessimism. 
3. Data and Research Design 
3.1. Sample Construction 
My initial sample comprises all managers listed in the ExecuComp database 
from 1995 to 2006. I follow managers over time and retain only those that switch 
firms at least once during my sample period. This makes it possible for me to separate 
the manager fixed effects from firm fixed effects and time-varying firm 
characteristics. If a manager stays with the same firm during my entire sample period, 
then the manager fixed effects would be perfectly correlated with the firm fixed 
effects. The manager positions in my sample, whom I identify by using the variable 
titleann in ExecuComp, include the CEOs, CFOs, and other top managers on file. I 
follow Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and further require that the manager must have 
been employed by both firms for at least three years. Thus, I ensure that the manager 
has sufficient time to impose his views on the firm. I note that the manager fixed 
effects are weaker when I include all manager turnovers in the ExecuComp database, 
but remain statistically significant when I exclude guidance issued during the first year 
of a manager’s tenure. For each firm that satisfies these requirements, I keep all 
observations with available data even if the firm has managers that I do not observe in 
multiple firms. I do not include these unidentified managers in the manager fixed 
effect estimation. I subsequently merge in the First Call Company Issued Guidelines 
(CIG) file and retain only managers that issue quarterly guidance in both firms. I 
include only forecasts of quarterly earnings per share on a primary basis exclusive of 
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extraordinary items in the sample. To assure comparability, I use actual earnings 
reported on the First Call Actuals file to compute guidance error and bias. I then 
merge data from Compustat, CRSP, and IBES to construct the firm characteristics, 
market reaction, and analysts’ forecast revision variables. The final sample of 
5,147observations comprises 479 managers across 709 firms. 18% of the observations 
are earnings announcements or earnings warnings that are released after the end of the 
firms’ fiscal periods. I also include guidance revisions to increase the power of my 
tests. Excluding either preannouncements or revisions from my sample does not 
weaken my results. 
3.2. Research Design 
To examine whether investors and analysts take into account manager-specific 
guidance accuracy and bias and incorporate this information in their responses to 
management guidance requires estimating the manager-specific effects on guidance. I 
follow Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and estimate the models below to obtain the 
individual manager effects on a firm’s guidance accuracy and bias. 
   k kit t i i m m ittError Year Firm Execα β λ γ ε= Χ + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (1) 
   k kit t i i m m ittBias Year Firm Execα β λ γ ε= Χ + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (2) 
I define the first dependent variable, Error, as the absolute difference between 
the management forecast and actual earnings, scaled by the firms’ end-of -quarter 
closing price. As a robustness check, I use beginning-of-quarter price as a scalar for all 
the guidance related variables. My results are robust to this specification.  
The second dependent variable, Bias, is actual earnings minus the management 
forecast, scaled by end-of-quarter price. Therefore, a positive value for Bias suggests 
that the management guidance is pessimistic. X is a vector of time-varying control 
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variables that prior studies find is associated with guidance characteristics. I control 
for the logged market value of firm equity (Size) because prior studies find that 
guidance issuances by larger firms tend to be more accurate and pessimistic (Ajinkya 
et al. 2005; Bhojraj, Libby, and Yang 2009). I also include the number of analysts 
following (Num) because Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that more heavily followed 
firms have higher disclosure levels. Firms that report losses may have more difficulty 
forecasting earnings, so I set Loss, which is an indicator variable, equal to one for 
firms that report negative earnings in the fiscal quarter. As my proxy for performance, 
I use return on assets (ROA), as Miller (2002) finds that disclosure quality declines 
with weaker earnings performance. I define earnings volatility (EarnVol) as the 
standard deviation of quarterly earnings for the 12 quarters before the current fiscal 
quarter, divided by median assets over 12 quarters. Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that 
firms with higher earnings volatility issue guidance with lower accuracy. Following 
prior studies, I also include market-to-book (M/B) as a proxy for proprietary costs 
because of its negative association with guidance. However, I can also consider M/B 
as a proxy for the information asymmetry between managers and market participants, 
which would then predict a positive association between M/B and guidance 
(Verrecchia 1990). 
I control for year and firm fixed effects by including an indicator variable for 
each year (Yeart) and an indicator variable for each firm (Firmi). I estimate the 
manager fixed effects by using Execm, my main variable of interest. The manager 
positions in my sample include the CEO, CFO, and Other. The Other category 
comprises COOs, chairmen, presidents, or subdivision CEOs, and subdivision 
presidents. I include managers in the Other category to be consistent with prior and 
concurrent studies, such as Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bamber et al. (2008), and 
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Dyreng et al. (2009), but the inferences remain the same if I remove this category from 
the sample.   
The advantage of the specification above is that it produces a coefficient for 
each manager in my sample and I can use that coefficient to quantify each manager’s 
guidance behavior. I remove firm-quarters where the firm has managers that I do not 
observe in multiple firms. These observations are dropped from the remaining 
analyses since they are no longer necessary for tests of H1 and H2. This procedure 
results in 1,182 observations with only forecasts issued by managers whose fixed 
effects I have estimated.  I examine my main research question by estimating the 
following models and utilizing the manager fixed effect estimates obtained from 
equations (1) and (2): 
Re
                         
k t t i m mkit i
m it m it itm m
Mkt action X Year Firm ExecError
ExecError GoodNews ExecError BadNews
α β λ γ
δ θ ε
= + + +
+ × + × +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑  (3) 
Re
                             
k t t i m mkit i
m it m it itm m
Mkt action X Year Firm ExecBias
ExecBias GoodNews ExecBias BadNews
α β λ γ
δ θ ε
= + + +
+ × + × +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑  (4) 
                             
k t t i m mkit i
m it m it itm m
ChgConsensus X Year Firm ExecError
ExecError GoodNews ExecError BadNews
α β λ γ
δ θ ε
= + + +
+ × + × +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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k t t i m mkit i
m it m it itm m
ChgConsensus X Year Firm ExecBias
ExecBias GoodNews ExecBias BadNews
α β λ γ
δ θ ε
= + + +
+ × + × +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑  (6) 
As in equations (1) and (2), I include firm fixed effects to control for the strong 
association between firms and managers. MktReaction is the sum of market-adjusted 
returns for the three day trading window centered on the guidance issuance date. 
ChgConsensus is the change in analysts’ consensus forecasts before and after 
management issues guidance. ExecError (ExecBias) is each manager’s fixed effect on 
Error (Bias) estimated from equations (1) and (2). News is management guidance 
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minus the prevailing analysts’ consensus forecast, scaled by end-of-quarter price. 
GoodNews (BadNews) is equal to guidance news if News is positive (negative) and 
zero otherwise. I follow the asymmetric reaction documented in past studies such as 
Jennings (1987), Williams (1996), and Hutton and Stocken (2009), using this 
specification to allow the coefficients on GoodNews and BadNews to vary due to the 
asymmetric reaction. Based on H1a and H2a, I predict that the coefficients on 
ExecError×GoodNews and ExecError×BadNews will be negative, because reactions 
to guidance should be negatively associated with guidance error. I also predict if 
investors adjust for manager pessimism by reacting more positively to good news and 
less negatively to bad news, then the coefficients on ExecBias×GoodNews will be 
positive and ExecBias×BadNews will be negative. In contrast, if investors and 
analysts do not consider differences in managers’ guidance, then the coefficients for 
all the interaction terms will be not be significantly different from zero. The control 
variables are similar to those used in equations (1) and (2), except for the inclusion of 
the news variables. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level to account for 
correlation of the residuals.4 Finally, following Bertrand and Schoar (2003), I weigh 
each manager fixed effect estimate by its inverse of the standard error to account for 
measurement error.  
4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 summarizes the 479 manager transitions across positions. The table 
shows that, 56 are managers who moved from a CEO position in one firm to a CEO 
position in another firm, one is a CEO who becomes a CFO, and 29 are CEOs who 
                                                 
4 I include both firm dummies and clustered standard errors in my model because it is necessary to have 
both when a model is not correctly specified. Firm dummies can be used to correct the standard errors if 
a model is correctly specified. Since this is unlikely to be the case in my empirical tests, I include firm 
fixed effects to control for unobserved firm factors and clustered standard errors to adjust for correlation 
between the residuals. See Petersen (2009) for a more detailed discussion. 
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move to a top position at another firm. Of the managers who start as CFOs, ten 
become CEOs, 77 move to other CFO positions, and 18 move to another top position, 
and 126 managers who start in a top position become a CEO or CFO at another firm. 
In untabulated results, I analyze differences in the size of the sample firms across the 
manager transitions. I find that managers in CEO or CFO positions are more likely to 
move to a new company when the hiring company is larger. Managers in non-CEO or 
non-CFO positions at larger firms are more likely to move to a smaller company to 
become the new CEO or CFO.  
In Table 2.1, the second row of each cell presents the percentage of the type of 
position transition relative to the overall sample. The percentages reported in Dyreng 
et al. (2009) are displayed in brackets.5 Generally, the reported frequencies of the 
different types of manager transitions are similar between this study and theirs.    
Table 2.1. Frequency of Manager Changes 
    Current Title   
Prior Title    CEO  CFO  Other  Total 







































Total    178  92  209  479 
This table summarizes the 479 manager transitions across firms and positions. The first entry in each 
cell reports the number of transitions from the row position to the column position. The second entry in 
each cell reports the percentage of the type of position transition compared to the overall sample. The 
table shows the percentage of the type of position transition reported in Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 
(2009) in brackets for comparison. “Other” refers to any job title other than CEO or CFO reported in 
the ExecuComp database. 
                                                 
5 I note that the number of managers in Dyreng et al. (2009) is 899 and thus larger than that of my 
sample. The difference is due to my requirement that managers issue guidance in both firms he/she 
worked for. This manager selection criterion significantly reduces the number of managers in my 




Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
  Manager Fixed‐Effects Sample  First Call Population 
Variable Name  N  Mean  Median  Std  N  Mean  Median  Std 
Guidance 
Characteristics 
               
Error  5,147  0.0061  0.0013  0.1241  15,253  0.0074  0.0018  0.0569 
Bias  5,147  ‐0.0033  0.0000  0.1242  15,253  ‐0.0040  0.0000  0.0573 
Firm 
Characteristics 
               
Size  5,147  7.6297  7.4581  1.5437  15,253  6.7325  6.6331  1.6924 
Loss  5,147  0.1817  0.0000  0.3856  15,253  0.2091  0.0000  0.4067 
Roa  5,147  0.0106  0.0136  0.0442  15,253  0.0086  0.0124  0.0420 
EarnVol  5,147  0.0253  0.0119  0.0872  15,253  0.0244  0.0122  0.0688 
Num  5,147  9.7789  8.0000  7.0095  15,253  7.1983  5.0000  6.0595 
M/B  5,147  3.0552  2.3729  26.6961  15,253  2.6233  2.1452  37.0656 
News  5,147  ‐0.0009  ‐0.0002  0.0150  15,253  ‐0.0026  ‐0.0004  0.4277 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the guidance properties and firm characteristic variables. The “Manager Fixed-Effects Sample” refers to the set of 
firm-quarter observations for firms that issue quarterly guidance and have at least one manager observed in multiple firms for a minimum of three years at each 
firm during 1995-2006. “First Call population” refers to all firm-quarter observations for firms that issue quarterly guidance and have available firm 
characteristics information on Compustat during 1993-2006. Error is the absolute difference between the management forecast and actual earnings, scaled by the 
end-of-quarter price. Bias is actual earnings minus the management forecast, scaled by the end-of-quarter price. Size is the logged market value of firm equity at 
quarter end. Loss is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported a loss. ROA is return on ending total assets. EarnVol is the standard deviation of 
quarterly earnings for the twelve quarters before the current fiscal quarter, divided by median assets over 12 quarters. Num is number of analysts following before 
guidance issuance. M/B is ending market to book. News is the management forecast minus prevailing analysts’ consensus, scaled by the end-of-quarter price.     
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Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables in my analyses. 
Columns 1 to 4 report summary statistics for the manager-firm matched sample. For 
comparison, columns 5 to 8 report equivalent summary statistics for all firms listed on 
the First Call CIG file with financial statement information available on Compustat for 
the period 1993 to 2006. Similar to Bertrand and Schoar (2003), the firms in my 
sample are larger (7.6297 vs. 6.7325, p<0.01) than the First Call population average 
and have a higher number of analysts following (9.7789 vs. 7.1983, p<0.01). This is 
due to the fact that my sample is limited to managers who only move among the top 
positions in the firms covered by the ExecuComp database. Managers who move to 
private firms, or to positions within large firms but below the top five levels, are 
dropped during my sample selection process. The firms in my sample are less likely to 
report losses (0.1817 vs. 0.2091, p<0.01) and have slightly higher return on assets 
(0.0106 vs. 0.0086, p<0.10). Their guidance are also more accurate (0.0061 vs. 
0.0074, p<0.01) and less optimistically (-0.0033 vs. -0.0040, p<0.01) biased compared 
to the average First Call firm. 
5. Results 
5.1. Manager Effects on Guidance 
Table 2.3 reports the results of my analyses of the effect of managers on firms’ 
guidance error and bias. Panel A of Table 2.3 reports the results for estimating 
equations (1) and (2). For each dependent variable, row 1 reports the adjusted R-
square from a base regression that excludes the manager fixed effects. Row 2 reports 
the F-statistic and associated p-value from tests of the joint significance of the 
manager fixed effects, and the adjusted R-square when I add the manager indicator 
variables to the regression. For both Error and Bias, the explanatory power of the 
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model increases by 2% when I include manager fixed effects.6 Following Dechow 
(1994) and Subramanyam (1996), I use a likelihood ratio test suggested by Vuong 
(1989) to statistically examine whether a model that accounts for managers explains 
more of the dependent variables. Using a one-tailed test for both of the guidance 
property variables, the Vuong statistic (untabulated) is significant at the 5% level. The 
F-statistics show that the manager fixed effects are significant at less than the 1% 
level. Consistent with Bamber et al. (2008), I find that managers play a significant role 
in firms’ guidance decisions.  
Panel B of Table 2.3 reports the distribution of the manager fixed effect 
coefficients estimated from Panel A. I provide the mean, 25th percentile, median, 75th 
percentile, and standard deviation. The results show that there is significant variation 
in the manager fixed effects. For example, the difference in Error for a manager at the 
75th percentile and a manager at the 25th percentile is 1.4% of price. I note that the 
average guidance error in my sample is only 0.6% of price, and that while the average 
bias in guidance is -0.3% of price, a manager at the 75th percentile in the Bias 
distribution issues guidance that is 0.7% (of price) less optimistically biased than a 
manager at the 25th percentile. These results suggest that managers have 
heterogeneous effects on guidance properties, and that the effects are economically 
significant.7 
                                                 
6 In untabulated analyses, I also study the manager fixed effects  for CEO, CFO, and Other, and find 
that CFOs have the strongest effect on guidance. However, I do not conduct separate tests for the three 
different manager positions in my following tests due to sample size constraints.  
7 In an earlier draft of this paper, I also find that managers have an effect on the timing and frequency of 
guidance issuances. However, I focus on accuracy and bias in this draft given prior research suggests 





Table 2.3. Manager Fixed Effects 
Panel A: Test of Manager Fixed Effects on Guidance 
Variable  Test of fixed effects on managers  N  Adjusted R‐sq
Error    5,147  49% 
Error  6.53 (<0.0001)  5,147  51% 
Bias    5,147  40% 
Bias  5.10 (<0.0001)  5,147  42% 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of the Manager Fixed Effects 
Variable  Sig 10%  Mean  P25  Median  P75  Std  P75 – P25
ExecError  101  0.0456  0.0366  0.0422  0.0504  0.0182  0.0100 
ExecBias  67  ‐0.0122  ‐0.0147  ‐0.0096  ‐0.0072  0.0189  0.0075 
Panel A reports the results from fixed-effects panel regressions with controls for time-varying firm 
characteristics and standard errors clustered at the firm level. For each dependent variable reported in 
column 1, the fixed effects included are row 1: firm and year fixed effects; and row 2: firm, year, and 
manager fixed effects. The vector of control variables includes Size, Loss, ROA, EarnVol, Num, and 
M/B. F-tests (F-statistics and associated p-value) for the joint significance of the manager fixed effects 
are reported. See Table 2.1 for variable definitions.     
Panel B reports the manager fixed-effect coefficients estimated from the following model: 
( ,  )            Error Bias Year Fixed Effects Firm Fixed Effects Manager Fixed Effectsk kit itα ε= Χ + + + +∑  
I estimate the fixed effects based on a sample of 5,147 quarterly guidance issued by 479 managers. 
Column 2 reports the number of manager fixed effects significant at the 10% level. Column 3 reports 
the mean fixed effect for Error and Bias. Columns 4, 5, 6, and 7 report the fixed effects at the 25th, 50th, 
and 75th percentile, and the standard deviation, respectively. The last column reports the fixed effect 
differences between the 75th and 25th percentiles. 
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5.2. Market Reaction to Guidance and Managers’ Guidance Behavior 
Table 2.4 shows the results for tests of H1. The dependent variable is the 
market reaction (MktReaction) to guidance.  I use abnormal returns as my proxy for 
the three-day window centered on the guidance issuance date. I regress MktReaction 
on the manager fixed-effects coefficients reported in the previous section, interacted 
with GoodNews and BadNews and a list of control variables with controls for firm and 
year fixed effects. If investors do not recognize differences in managers’ guidance 
behavior, then the coefficients on ExecError, ExecBias, and the interaction terms 
should not be significantly different from zero. Column 3 of Table 2.4 shows that the 
signs on ExecError×GoodNews and ExecError×BadNews are negative (δ=-0.3883 
and θ=-0.2841, p<0.05 and p<0.01). This finding suggests that investors react less 
positively (negatively) to each unit of good (bad) news issued by managers who have 
higher guidance errors. Column 4 shows that the coefficients on ExecBias×GoodNews 
and ExecBias×BadNews are positive and negative (δ=0.9249 and θ=-0.3660, p<0.01 
and p<0.01), respectively. Since Bias is defined as actual earnings minus management 
guidance, this finding suggests that investors adjust for manager-specific biases by 
responding more positively (less negatively) to good (bad) news issued by managers 
who are more pessimistic in their guidance issuances. 
The signs of the coefficients on ExecError and ExecBias (α=-0.01 and 0.01, 
p<0.01 and p<0.01) are also consistent with investors giving a premium to managers 
who are more accurate and pessimistic, i.e. managers who tend to surprise the market 
less with bad news when actual earnings are announced. On balance, these results 
suggest that investors take into account manager-specific guidance behavior in their 










ExecError  ‐  ‐0.0100***   
    (0.0028)   
ExecError×GoodNews  ‐  ‐0.3883**   
    (0.1705)   
ExecError×BadNews  ‐  ‐0.2841***   
    (0.0898)   
ExecBias  +    0.0100** 
      (0.0043) 
ExecBias×GoodNews  +    0.9249*** 
      (0.2743) 
ExecBias×BadNews  ‐    ‐0.3660*** 
      (0.0771) 
GoodNews  +  5.4772***  5.3118*** 
    (1.6131)  (1.1269) 
BadNews  +  4.9237***  3.4903*** 
    (0.8728)  (0.4165) 
       
Firm Fixed Effects    Y  Y 
Year Fixed Effects    Y  Y 
Control Variables    Y  Y 
Adjusted R‐sq    58.73%  58.93% 
Observations  1,182     
This table presents results from testing the association of market reaction to management guidance with 
manager fixed effects estimated in Table 2.3 Panel A. The sample includes 1,182 quarterly management 
guidance issuances. MktReaction is the sum of market-adjusted returns for the three-day window 
around the guidance issuance date. GoodNews (BadNews) is equal to guidance news if News is positive 
(negative). The vector of control variables includes Size, Loss, ROA, EarnVol, Num, and M/B. 
Coefficient standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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ExecError  ‐  ‐0.0008***   
    (0.0002)   
ExecError×GoodNews  ‐  ‐0.0042   
    (0.0128)   
ExecError×BadNews  ‐  ‐0.0262***   
    (0.0067)   
ExecBias  +    0.0010*** 
      (0.0003) 
ExecBias×GoodNews  +    0.0919 
      (0.0766) 
ExecBias×BadNews  ‐    ‐0.0699*** 
      (0.0052) 
GoodNews  +  0.0851  0.0153 
    (0.1211)  (0.0186) 
BadNews  +  0.5777***  0.5569*** 
    (0.0655)  (0.0283) 
       
Firm Fixed Effects    Y  Y 
Year Fixed Effects    Y  Y 
Control Variables    Y  Y 
Adjusted R‐sq    73.59%  76.97% 
Observations  1,182     
This table presents the results from testing the association of change in analysts’ consensus forecasts to 
management guidance with manager fixed effects estimated in Table 2.3 Panel A. The sample includes 
1,182 quarterly management guidance issuances. ChgConsensus is the difference between analysts’ 
consensus forecasts before and after management issues guidance. GoodNews (BadNews) is equal to 
guidance news if News is positive (negative). Coefficient standard errors are in parentheses. The vector 
of control variables includes Size, Loss, ROA, EarnVol, Num, and M/B. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
5.3. Change in Analysts’ Consensus Forecasts and Managers’ Guidance Behavior 
Table 2.5 reports the results for tests of changes in analysts’ consensus 
forecasts to management guidance. As with investors, the coefficients on 
ExecError×BadNews and ExecBias×BadNews are both negative and significant (θ=-
0.0262 and -0.0699, p<0.01 and p<0.01). This is consistent with H2 and suggests that 
analysts do take into account manager-specific guidance behavior by revising their 
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forecasts less for bad news if the manager is more inaccurate or more pessimistic. The 
coefficients on ExecError×GoodNews and ExecBias×GoodNews are both in the 
hypothesized direction but nonsignificant (δ=-0.0042 and 0.0919, p>0.10 and p>0.10). 
The coefficient on BadNews is positive and significant (α=0.5777 and 0.5569, p<0.01 
and p<0.01), but the coefficient on GoodNews is positive and nonsignificant 
(α=0.0851 and 0.0153, p>0.10 and p>0.10) for both regressions. This finding may be 
due to either bad news being inherently more credible, such that analysts’ responses to 
bad news are stronger, or the finding may reflect a lack of experience in novice 
analysts. Generally, the results in Table 2.5 provide some support for H2, since I find 
that analysts only adjust for differences in managers’ guidance accuracy and bias 
when firms issue bad news but not good news.8 
5.4. Analyst Forecasting Experience and Managers’ Guidance Behavior 
In this section, I examine whether analyst forecasting experience plays a role in 
determining analysts’ responses to manager-specific guidance behavior.  Mikhail et al. 
(1997) find that analysts’ accuracy improves with their forecasting experience. Using 
a sample from the Zacks database of quarterly forecasts made by 236 analysts during 
1980-1995, Mikhail et al. show that the error in analyst forecasts declines as the 
number of forecasts an analyst has issued for a firm increases. To the extent that 
analyst forecasting experience is a significant determinant of forecast performance, it 
is also likely to be associated with analysts’ ability to recognize differences in 
managers’ guidance behavior.  
 
                                                 
8 In untabulated analyses, I also examine whether the initiation of analyst coverage is associated with 
manager turnovers. However, I find little evidence of such an association. This lack of evidence is not 
surprising given that analysts often follow a portfolio of firms in the same industry so the analyst is 
likely to be already following the hiring firm if a manager moves between firms within the same 
industry. On the other hand, an analyst is unlikely to initiate coverage of the hiring firm if a manager 
moves across industries.  
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ExecError  ‐ 0.0057 ‐0.0050*
  (0.0049) (0.0033)
ExecError×GoodNews  ‐ 0.3724** ‐0.5691***
  (0.1728) (0.2192)
ExecError×BadNews  ‐ 4.0881*** ‐0.9515**
  (0.4344) (0.4497)
ExecBias  + ‐0.0214 ‐0.0092
  (0.0086) (0.0075)
ExecBias×GoodNews  + ‐0.6245** 0.8630***
  (0.2997) (0.3148)
ExecBias×BadNews  ‐ ‐6.5322*** ‐3.3998**
  (0.7161) (1.6197)
GoodNews  + ‐4.6777*** 7.3226*** ‐3.8947*** 5.3317***
  (1.7175) (2.5959) (1.4226) (1.8130)
BadNews  + ‐12.2107*** 19.8953*** 3.4510 9.3999***
  (3.6883) (2.9968) (2.4088) (2.4819)
Firm Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y
Brokerage Fixed Effects  Y Y Y Y
Control Variables  Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R‐sq  52.36% 62.14% 52.54% 62.18%
Observations  3,283 2,544 3,283 2,544
This table presents results from testing the association of individual analysts’ revisions to management guidance with manager fixed effects estimated in Table 
2.3 Panel A. The sample includes 5,827 individual analyst forecast revisions. Experience is the number of prior firm quarters an analyst has appeared in the IBES 
Detail file. ChgForecast is the change in analysts’ individual forecasts before and after management issues guidance. GoodNews (BadNews) is equal to guidance 
news if News is positive (negative). Coefficient standard errors are in parentheses. The vector of control variables includes Size, Loss, ROA, EarnVol, Num, and 
M/B. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Therefore, to test whether analysts’ responses to management guidance vary 
with analyst forecasting experience, I match individual analyst forecasts from the 
IBES Detail file with my sample, resulting in 5,827 analyst forecast revisions around 
the issuance of management guidance. The mean level of forecasting experience 
(Experience) for the analysts in this sample is 17 quarters. I define Experience as the 
number of prior firm quarters the analyst has appeared in the IBES Detail file. I then 
split forecasts at the mean of Experience into high experience and low experience 
groups and run the following regressions within each of these groups.     
ker
                             
k t t i j m mkit i j
m it m it itm m
ChgForecast X Year Firm Bro age ExecError
ExecError GoodNews ExecError BadNews
α β λ ω γ
δ θ ε
= + + + +
+ × + × +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑  (7) 
ker
                             
k t t i j m mkit i j
m it m it itm m
ChgForecast X Year Firm Bro age ExecBias
ExecBias GoodNews ExecBias BadNews
α β λ ω γ
δ θ ε
= + + + +
+ × + × +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑  (8) 
Equations (7) and (8) are similar to the earlier tests that I use to examine 
changes in analysts’ consensus forecasts in response to management guidance. 
ChgForecast, is the change in analysts’ forecasts after management guidance issuance. 
I also control for brokerage fixed effects because prior research finds systematic 
differences in analyst forecast accuracy between large and small employers (Clement 
1999). If, in their responses to management guidance, analyst forecasting experience is 
not associated with their ability to take into account managers’ guidance behavior, 
then I should not expect a difference between the two groups. Table 2.6 provides the 
results of
 
estimating equations (7) and (8). The results in Table 2.6 suggest that this is 
likely to be driven by the lack of forecasting experience for a subset of analysts. 
Column 2 reports that the coefficients on ExecError×GoodNews and 
ExecError×BadNews are negative (δ=-0.5691 and θ=-0.9515, p<0.01 and p<0.05) 
and consistent with experienced analysts placing less weight on guidance by managers 
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who have higher forecast errors. The coefficients on ExecBias ×GoodNews and 
ExecBias ×BadNews in column 4 (δ=0.8630 and θ=-3.3998, p<0.01 and p<0.05) are 
consistent with experienced analysts considering managers’ guidance bias by 
responding more positively to good news and less negatively to bad news when 
manager guidance pessimism increases. The coefficients on the news variables are 
also positive and significant for the high experience analysts group.     
To determine if firm-specific experience is incremental to general forecasting 
experience, I create another variable that measures the number of years an analyst has 
followed the same firm. The mean number of firm-specific forecasting experience is 
six quarters and the mean in the top quartile is nine. For the subsample of analysts in 
the top quartile, I find evidence consistent with analysts adjusting for managers’ 
guidance behavior. This result suggests that firm-specific forecasting experience plays 
a role in analysts’ ability to recognize manager-specific guidance behavior incremental 
to general experience.  
These results indicate that analysts also consider differences in managers’ 
guidance accuracy and bias in their forecast revisions when analysts themselves have 
sufficient forecasting experience. 
6. Additional Analyses 
6.1. Alternative Proxy for Managers’ Guidance Behavior 
To examine the robustness of the manager fixed effects approach I construct an 
alternative proxy for managers’ guidance behavior. Brochet et al. (2009) report that 
breaks in firm’s guidance patterns are more likely to occur following executive 
turnover and that guidance precision is reduced when firms do provide guidance. 
Therefore, I identify the first guidance issued by a newly appointed manager. I define 
the observation as Skilled equal to one if the earnings estimate is at least as accurate as 
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the firm’s last guidance that was issued before the manager’s appointment. I re-
estimate equations (3) and (5) by replacing the manager fixed effect coefficients with 
the new indicator variable Skilled. Consistent with the results reported in section V, 
when MktReaction is the dependent variable the coefficient on Skilled is positive and 
significant at the 0.05 level. However, I do not find a relation between ChgConsensus 
and Skilled. This lacuna could be due to the significant number of missing 
observations for analysts’ consensus forecasts, which leads to a significant reduction 
in sample size.  
6.2. Annual Guidance 
To examine whether the results can be generalized to annual guidance, I also 
perform the tests by using annual guidance listed on the CIG file. Consistent with my 
hypotheses, I find that for a sample of firms’ annual guidance, investors and analysts 
also adjust for differences in managers’ guidance behavior in their responses.  
7. Conclusion 
My goal in this paper is to document whether investors and analysts recognize 
and adjust for differences in managers’ guidance behavior. My results indicate that 
differences in managers’ guidance behavior are incorporated by investors and analysts 
in their responses to guidance. I find that investors assess more credibility to accurate 
managers by reacting more positively (negatively) to their good (bad) news guidance. 
Investors also adjust for the bias in guidance by reacting more positively to good news 
guidance and less negatively to bad news guidance issued by managers with greater 
pessimism. My results also suggest that analyst experience plays an important role in 
their responses to management guidance. I find that when analysts have sufficient 
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forecasting experience, they also adjust for managers’ guidance accuracy and bias in 
their forecast revisions to both good news and bad news guidance.  
Although the literature on earnings guidance provides several alternative 
explanations for why firms issue guidance and what firm characteristics are associated 
with guidance properties, we know very little about the effect of managers on firms’ 
guidance decisions. The findings in this paper shed light on this issue. In my empirical 
design, I assume that managers’ guidance behavior is fixed, but it is possible that 
managers acquire these skills over time. Therefore, future research might examine 
whether managers exhibit a learning pattern in their guidance issuances, similar to that 
of analysts.  
The reputational effect of guidance is only one of the many consequences to 
managers for having his/her own voluntary disclosure style. Future studies might 
examine whether managers’ guidance accuracy and bias are associated with their 
compensation levels and career trajectory.  
Finally, given that investors underreact to management guidance news and that 
the underreaction is reduced for firms with higher credibility (Ng, Tuna, and Verdi 
2007), future studies might examine whether investor underreaction is also reduced for 
managers with a reputable guidance track record. 
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